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At nine years old, an Indonesian child found herself as the sole survivor of a family suicide 
bombing that was one of several terrorist attacks involving women and children in Indonesia 
during 2018. Amongst many conversations, the reality facing this indoctrinated and orphaned child 
now under state care ignited a discussion around formerly violent extremists returning safely to 
society. This discussion is complemented by considering how the repatriation of extremists and 
their affiliates from Syria across the globe forces states to address the returning population with 
measures specialized to their experience. How extensively have the Indonesian and Malaysian 
governments incorporated holistic psychological, social, and economic factors that are critical to 
facilitate reintegration into their post-extremism programming? I argue that Indonesia and 
Malaysia have narrowly considered some of the underlying factors that facilitate reintegration in 
their post-extremism programs using a comprehensive country comparison. Though Indonesia and 
Malaysia remain prime implementers of diverse programming for former extremists, the states are 
ultimately unable to address key factors that would otherwise maximize successful reintegration 
and broadly successful programming. Primarily, by focusing their approaches on deradicalization 
the states undercut their potential. Reintegration is a more effective goal for state-level post-
extremism programming and thus, must be a central focus. These considerations and others 
explored throughout are paramount to the development of comprehensive reintegration programs 
in Southeast Asia that adequately address the needs, perspectives, and identities of those who 
return from extremism.   
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 1 
Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
 In 2002, David Rapoport first identified “the four waves of rebel terror” to characterize 
some of the complicated history around the wars on terror that spanned back to the 19th century 
(Rapoport, 2002). Modern experts identified a “fifth wave” of terror with a transnational identity 
that strengthened as globalization stretched across the world (Brown, 2017; Kaplan, 2008; Or 
and Ido, 2019). This modernized and powerful force of terror targets populations far beyond one 
country’s borders and often remains resistant to localized attack. Modern responses to 
transnational terrorism still rely heavily on military force, a short-term solution that does not 
address the underlying systemic factors that drive individuals to radicalize or join terrorist 
organizations in the first place. Military might fails to prevent people from radicalizing, and 
instead, contributes to the narratives utilized by extremists to persuade more towards their cause. 
Then as the world watched ISIS lose major footing in Iraq and Syria beginning in 2017, states 
were challenged to respond to a return of extremists who were bred in these transnational 
networks (Habulan, 2018). Whether through deportation or forced migration, this population is 
returning from training and fighting in foreign conflicts to communities often unprepared for 
their arrival. From Australia to the United States, countries are testing approaches that imprison, 
inform, and integrate radicalized individuals back into society.  
Southeast Asia is an important region to study the possibilities of state responses as it is a 
uniquely diverse microcosm for transnational terrorism and its impacts. In the region, terrorist 
networks are fluid through state borders especially those of Indonesia, Malaysia, and the 
Philippines (Borelli, 2017). The countries are also heavily burdened with the return of foreign 
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terrorist fighters (FTFs) from conflicts in Syria, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, which creates 
additional challenges for designing specialized approaches to counter foreign extremism 
(Ryacudu, 2018). As such, efforts to holistically integrate extremists back into society is a 
critical response to these challenges and they are employed in both Indonesia and Malaysia. 
Moreover, the early variety and success of these state-level programs gained international 
recognition as examples of the necessity of battling the new era extremism with long-term and 
forward-thinking approaches. Indonesia and Malaysia, both Muslim majority states, incorporate 
programs for returning extremists into their counterterrorism agendas as they face a multitude of 
domestic social and political consequences from transnational terrorism. Therefore, the two 
countries serve as an important point of analysis to study the reintegration of extremists as a 
modernized approach to counterterrorism in a globalizing world. 
         Reintegration is the process of how an extremist transitions from a terrorist or radical 
environment to civil society while adopting a productive nonviolent identity. The recent 
emphasis on understanding reintegration reflects an emerging shift away from why individuals 
radicalize to why individuals quit terrorism (Silke, 2003; Hwang, 2018). Understanding the path 
of disillusionment from extremism is highly complex and often characterized as a gradual, 
multifaceted, and personal process similar to joining networks of violent extremism. Thus, more 
scholars have begun to shift their focus to how, and under what conditions, individuals leave 
extremism (Horgan, 2009). Within this realm of scholarship, I will study how extensively 
Indonesian and Malaysian governments incorporated psychological, social, and economic 
reintegration factors into their post-extremism programming. 
Additionally, parallels drawn between studies in criminology and post-war combatants 
illustrate that a wealth of knowledge is available to understand the path individuals take 
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following their involvement with gangs, violent crime, combat, and the like. Insights from these 
seemingly disparate fields can help illuminate why some actors distance or denounce their 
experiences of crime, trauma, or ideology in an extremist context. The literature can also inform 
policies designed to prevent backsliding while influencing preemptive interventions for former 
terrorists (Mullins, 2010). Furthermore, research on paths out of extremism provides 
policymakers and civil society with tools to curb violent extremism and tactics to trigger 
disillusionment and voluntary reintegration (Hwang, 2018). This thesis explores current work on 
post-extremism experiences and argues for the intentional inclusion of reintegration into the 
counterterrorism landscape in Indonesia, Malaysia, and Southeast Asia more generally. 
In this chapter, I introduce my research question and answer and briefly discuss the 
implications of a reintegration approach within counterterrorism. Next, I will dive into the 
literature of this field in a discussion of the ambiguity around terminology that impedes progress 
in studies of counterterrorism strategy, and I clarify definitions for several key terms. 
Additionally, I will discuss the current limitations of evaluating the success of reintegration 
programming and the need for measures that extend beyond tracking recidivism rates.1 Towards 
the end of the chapter, the methodology section describes the various sources analyzed during 
the construction of my argument including firsthand accounts, news articles, and government 
sources. The chapter concludes with a roadmap of the remaining four chapters of my thesis. 
 
 
 
1 Recidivism is defined by the National Institute of Justice as a relapse into criminal behavior. Measured by criminal 
actions causing arrest, conviction, or imprisonment following punishment or intervention for a previous offense 
(NIJ, 2019). This term will be explored in more detail in subsequent chapters.   
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1.1 Research Question 
How extensively have the Indonesian and Malaysian governments incorporated holistic 
psychological, social, and economic factors that are critical to facilitate reintegration into their 
post-extremism programming? I answer this question by drawing from the history of 
reintegration and counterterrorism efforts in Indonesia and Malaysia as well as psychological and 
policy discussions around reintegration. I argue that Indonesia and Malaysia engage in 
reintegration style programming to a limited degree by utilizing some but not all key underlying 
factors of reintegration and by focusing more on deradicalizing rather than reintegrating 
extremists. Indonesia, as one of the world’s largest democracies, is heralded for its efforts toward 
a diverse counterterrorism agenda. Similarly, Malaysia is a vocal collaborator on international 
efforts towards global security. Therefore, the two states’ programs provide important insight 
towards understanding how to ease extremists out of their terrorist networks.  
Through my analysis, I demonstrate that the main factors that facilitate reintegration fall 
into three categories - psychological, social, and economic. Reintegration programming that 
addresses these categories must provide and enforce individual and family counseling, 
community social awareness/de-stigmatization, foster new relationships and personal identity, 
interfaith and intergroup dialogue, programming specialized to support diverse identities, 
financial means for former extremists to support themselves plus their families, and paths toward 
purposeful employment. Once programs adequately integrate these factors, tailoring to domestic 
needs and societal structure, they are most likely to catalyze and sustain reintegration while 
preventing recidivism and additional security threats. Furthermore, reintegration programs that 
are supported at a state level in coordination with community-based groups and 
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nongovernmental organizations can facilitate the long-term individual support that reintegrating 
extremists require.  
The governments of Indonesia and Malaysia currently provide degrees of primarily 
psychological and financial support in their counterterrorism programming. The two states 
attempt major ideological reform in targeted extremists by focusing on efforts to pluralize,2 
counsel religiously and within families, provide limited paths to gain employment, and give 
some monetary support to extremists and/or their families. However, despite these efforts, there 
are still an array of psychological, economic, and social factors that are not confronted. This 
deficit is evident as measures to collaborate with community-based organizations that facilitate 
effective social reintegration amongst groups are limited, social inclusion efforts are not 
emphasized, extremist minority populations such as women and children are not adequately 
addressed, and relationships between state-affiliated mentors and former extremists lack long 
term maintenance. The intersection of these shortcomings is important to recognize as it 
indicates a lack of effective enforcement, proper resourcing, and an underwhelming state 
investment into long term community-based reintegration solutions.  
 Thus, despite the use of some key factors that facilitate reintegration, post-extremism 
programs in Indonesia and Malaysia are mainly focused on deradicalization. But, 
deradicalization without reintegration is doomed to be ineffective. Additionally, while 
international collaboration on reintegration programming is essential to robust counterterrorism 
in Indonesia and Malaysia, regional militarization of the programs will adversely impact the 
current progress made under mainly police and community management. Indonesia and Malaysia 
 
2 Efforts to pluralize are undertaken in a social context with other former extremists, imprisoned terrorists, major 
Islamic faith leaders, and other state representatives.  
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both receive international respect for their efforts towards countering violent extremism (CVE)3, 
yet there are several areas of improvement for their reintegration programs. Primarily, further 
adaptations to programming would better address recent evolutions in women’s and children’s 
involvement in terrorist activity within Indonesia and Malaysia as well as modern obstacles, 
including social media, to the process of quitting terrorism.  
 
1.2 Literature Review 
First, to examine the processes and programs extremists experience in Indonesia and 
Malaysia, it is paramount to comprehend disengagement, deradicalization, rehabilitation, and 
reintegration - the foundational terminology of the field. Gunaratna & Sabariah (2019) claim the 
concepts of disengagement, deradicalization, rehabilitation, and reintegration are set within an 
“intellectual minefield”. Mostly these terms are categorized in a discussion of disengagement 
and deradicalization with the frequent but secondary examination of rehabilitation and 
reintegration. Creating consistent definitions is difficult, and thus few scholars dedicate the time 
to undertake this laborious task. Thus, the interactions between the terms require focused 
interpretation to frame how states set goals and make productive policy decisions towards 
countering violent extremism. 
 
Disengagement and Deradicalization  
 
3 Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) refers to policy interventions aimed at combating the danger and impact of 
terrorism. (Schomburg, 2016). The concept can also cover more proactive actions to “counter efforts by extremists 
to recruit, radicalize, and mobilize followers to violence” and “should be incorporated into existing programs related 
to public safety, resilience, inclusion, and violence prevention” (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2020).  
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Deradicalization is understood as a definitive, often individualized, shift away from 
radical ideology. Koehler (2017) defines deradicalization as both an individual and collective 
process that marks the cognitive change from radical or extremist identity toward a moderate or 
non-extreme inner ideology. Deradicalization involves inner and interpersonal development to 
inspire a meaningful ideological change. Hwang (2018) posits that deradicalization, “denotes the 
delegitimation of the ideology underpinning the use of violence”. Accordingly, Hwang (2018) 
positions disengagement as a process through which an affiliate of an extremist or terrorist group 
ends participation with the movement or experiences a role change within the network, both 
processes being characterized by distancing from (direct) acts of violence. 
Disengagement is a change in behavior while deradicalization is a change in beliefs 
(Bjørgo & Horgan, 2014; Hwang, 2018). Given that beliefs can be harder to modify than actions, 
disengagement would logically precede deradicalization (El-Said & Harrigan, 2013). For 
example, Gunaratna and Sabariah (2019) describe the process of leaving an extremist network as 
beginning with a radical individual disengaging from violence then undergoing rehabilitation, 
becoming deradicalized, and subsequently being reintegrated into society. However, the 
literature indicates that deradicalization does not require disengagement and likewise 
disengagement does not always require deradicalization (Hwang, 2018; Gunaratna & Sabariah, 
2019). Furthermore, although discussed as separate concepts, these processes exist along a 
spectrum and it may not be possible to say, or separate, when exactly an extremist progresses 
from disengagement to deradicalization, for example. 
Koehler (2017) emphasizes the difference between disengagement and deradicalization 
as disengagement denotes a more behavioral or environmental distancing from radical ideology 
while deradicalization is characteristically a more deeply cognitive and psychological process. 
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The distinction between these two terms represents the vast gaps in programming since states 
face more challenges to forcing individuals to change their ideology than to separate from 
extremist activity. A far more applicable goal for state programming is to uplift individuals from 
their situation, whether from a radical group or gang, than facilitate mental dissociation from the 
logic of extremism. For example, pathways through incarceration and mentorship may facilitate 
behavioral change but not impact personal truths held by extremists. That step would require a 
level of willingness in the participant to formulate ideological change.  
 
Rehabilitation and Reintegration  
Rehabilitation and reintegration represent another facet of the discussion as the two are 
often utilized almost synonymously. The discussion of rehabilitation as interchangeable with or 
to achieve disengagement, deradicalization or reintegration, exemplifies a lack of precision and 
consensus on how rehabilitation is used in the field (Holmer & Shtuni, 2017; Mullins, 2010; 
Veldhuis, 2012). The imprecision surrounding the use of rehabilitation as a distinctive stage in 
post-extremist pathways stands in contrast to the term’s prevalence and utility in other fields 
such as addiction and criminology. For example, Lynch (2000) defines rehabilitation as any 
actions or discourse (including psychological, substance abuse treatment, educational, and 
vocational programming) that works to transform an extremist into a non-criminal citizen. 
Rehabilitation can thus be considered a mechanism for introducing positive psychological 
development in radicalized individuals.  
Most crucial to the content of my analysis is the term reintegration. Hwang (2018) 
defines reintegration as a process by which inner competition for identity displaces the extremist 
mentality with a new social identity. This definition involves new relationships taking the place 
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of old ones and the ex-combatant finding employment. Furthermore, her definition of 
reintegration contrasts with more passive definitions of reintegration as a simple and often 
unavoidable form of physical return by extremists or criminals experiencing incarceration 
(James, 2016). Variable and passive definitions of reintegration highlight the lack of attention 
and importance given to the term compared to the larger body of literature around disengagement 
and deradicalization.  
However, reintegration can illuminate the most extensive environmental and 
psychologically transformative shift for a radicalized individual. The process of an extremist 
reintegrating into society reflects not only an eventual process in the possible life cycle of an 
extremist but the process of newly defining self against and within civil society. This 
conceptualization of reintegration addresses the term’s deficits in current usage, created by 
scholars using only a passive definition of the term, to better serve counterterrorism strategies.  
In summary, given this discussion of how these terms are used loosely and inconsistently 
defined in the field, I will adopt the following conceptualizations of the terms. I will address 
disengagement as the process in which a member of an extremist or terrorist network ceases 
participation, experiences a role change, or distances from direct acts of violence as primarily 
suggested by Hwang (2018). Combining contributions from both Hwang (2018) and Koehler 
(2017), I consider deradicalization to be a deliberate and conscious cognitive change from 
extremist ideology toward a moderate, plural, or non-radical belief system. Additionally, as 
rehabilitation is arguably the least clarified term in this field, I characterize rehabilitation as a 
process of intervention to catalyze a transformative psychological change that will reconstitute 
the extremist’s former mental state.  
  
 
10 
 
Finally, I argue that reintegration should be transformed into a stronger focal point in the 
field. Thus, I define it as the process of an individual undergoing substantial behavioral and 
cognitive changes towards the construction of a new social identity and personal purpose as they 
return to a nonviolent and functional role within society. The differences between 
disengagement, deradicalization, rehabilitation, and reintegration may appear subtle. 
Nonetheless, these concepts are necessary to understand and facilitate the long and complex 
process of moving from terrorist to civilian. 
 
Related Programming 
While I will examine specific programmatic efforts to facilitate reintegration and 
deradicalization and discuss in detail related programming employed in Indonesia and Malaysia 
in subsequent chapters, the literature on these programs is broad, creating some limitations. 
Particularly, the role of the state and counterterrorism infrastructure is assessed through studies 
of terrorism within the criminal system, how communities engage with extremists, and violations 
of human rights of those accused of terrorist involvement (Koehler 2017; Veldhuis 2012). 
However, the recent proliferation of studies on deradicalization and reintegration created a body 
of research aimed at discussing and evaluating the programs that frame individuals’ experience 
with conceptual beliefs. This type of analysis allows for new understandings of what factors 
underlie extremism in different regions and the possibility of improvement in approaches to 
reintegration programming globally. Therefore, by identifying and establishing strong definitions 
of these terms and maintaining reintegration as the most effective endpoint on a policy level, I 
will elucidate the factors that facilitate reintegration in the field and within Indonesia and 
Malaysia society.  
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Varying programmatic approaches to facilitate individuals’ transitions post extremism are 
seen around the world. For example, Malaysia’s rehabilitation program is highly revered and 
although it’s 95% success rate is self-reported, some observers point to the country’s lack of 
major terrorist attacks in recent history as an indicator of its success (Koehler 2017). The country 
makes use of an approach that focuses on religious reeducation, the imposition of the 
responsibilities of Malaysian citizenship, and vocational training that allows for reintegration 
(Guay, 2018; Gunaratna & Sabariah, 2019; Koehler 2017).  
Indonesia’s programming also gained a level of international praise by making use of 
religious counseling, social support, and support for employment surrounding former extremists 
(Gunaratna & Sabariah, 2019). The commitment to these programs differs from that of the 
Western world, where France recently closed its only deradicalization program and the United 
States decided to extend sentences for convicted terrorists (Suratman, 2017). These differences 
suggest the importance of context in studies of reintegration and why terrorists quit. 
Additionally, the differences illustrate that attempts to generalize findings in the field are limiting 
and reveal the need for further study of specific CVE programming. To address this need, I will 
present an intraregional country comparison between Indonesia and Malaysia, whose terror 
networks are historically interconnected (Hwang, 2018) and who represent two of the main CVE 
programs in Southeast Asia (Sabariah, 2019). 
 
The Evaluation of Programming 
Evaluation and critical investigation of reintegration programs are complicated by a lack 
of reliable data, the necessity of programs to be context-specific, and the absence of a strong 
metric for success. For example, Mullins (2010) cites a lack of data as a major obstacle to 
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analysis. Similarly, Silke (2003) points out that the available data for disengagement is often 
autobiographical and must be used with caution. Studies that are conducted on programs may be 
informative, but only for the specific setting of the program which can limit the possibility to 
generalize the findings (Veldhuis, 2012).  
One of the biggest limitations is the use of recidivism rates as the singular measure of 
success for reintegration programs. Recidivism represents a quantitative measure of reintegration 
that on its own is inherently imperfect as numbers can rarely quantify or measure an individual’s 
inner experience. Critics argue that a standardized measure of the day-to-day functioning of 
those reintegrated is needed to supplement basic recidivism rates (Berghuis, 2018). Nevertheless, 
although measuring recidivism through indicators such as rearrests, reconviction, and 
reincarceration can be difficult due to problems with data credibility and accuracy, recidivism is 
a useful partial indicator of the success achieved by reintegration programming (Mullins, 2010). 
Overall, recidivism must be accompanied by qualitative evaluation and study of both 
reintegration programming and individuals undergoing reintegration. 
Beyond the lack of data and reliable measures of success, a further challenge is 
identifying the relevant target populations in which to measure success. Today, given the rise in 
FTFs and repatriated extremists, programming evaluations must address these populations, 
domestic extremists in detention, and a control population. Such a control population would be 
former extremists who do not participate in reintegration programming or unmanipulated 
extremists. Comparison to this type of control group would benefit measuring the progress of 
reintegration and the reach of programming, however, identifying and testing the control 
population is nearly impossible (Veldhuis, 2012). Another challenge is the ability to interview 
and study active extremists in sufficient numbers, which makes it difficult to compare 
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reintegrated individuals to those who did not succeed or participate in the programs (See, 2018). 
I will address the further challenges in subsequent chapters. 
The evaluation also requires identifying a set of clear objectives to be assessed. A meta-
analysis of reentry programs for adult male criminal offenders recently pointed to the need for 
theoretical grounding in the field of reintegration (Berghuis, 2018). Veldhuis states that a lack of 
tangible theory limits the success of reintegration programs (Veldhuis, 2012). The development 
of well-stated objectives and theory in programs for former extremists provides greater 
accountability, enables the selection of proper methods, and defines whether a program works 
and why it works (Veldhuis, 2012; Horgan, 2008). Laying out clear objectives is a necessary step 
to promote proper self-evaluation, which would fill a large deficit in the literature around 
reintegration programming. At the same time, it would prevent program guidelines from crossing 
too far into forcing ideology and infringing on basic human rights as these programs are 
spearheaded by political bodies (Veldhuis, 2012). Monitoring the ethics of manipulating 
individuals’ ideologies to fit ideals of the state is a lesser developed evaluation piece in the field 
but remains highly relevant to Indonesia’s and Malaysia’s history of human rights abuses 
(Human Rights Watch, 2004; Human Rights Watch, 2002).  
Finally, how we think about a concept can affect how we measure it, and consequently, 
how we measure a concept affects how we think about it (Isbell, 2020). My thesis aims to change 
how we think about post-extremism programming by emphasizing reintegration and thereby, 
influencing how reintegration is measured beyond recidivism as a primary measure. With these 
stated limitations in mind, I will evaluate the current models of reintegration programming in 
Indonesia and Malaysia to distinguish key factors that influence the reintegration of extremists 
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into these two societies. Through a more robust context-specific evaluation, I will compare the 
two states and define important conclusions regarding reintegration programming.  
 
1.3 Methodology 
The primary evidence I use to analyze reintegration in Indonesia and Malaysia includes 
personal accounts from former extremists and those affiliated with reintegration efforts, news 
and NGO reports of recent violent extremism, and governmental records of incarceration and 
counterterrorism from both countries. These primary sources characterize the narratives present 
in a post-extremism path, the current landscape of terrorism in Indonesia and Malaysia, and the 
success of the region’s efforts to prevent violent extremism. Scholarly articles as well as local 
NGO and human rights organization reports represent the secondary sources I use to interpret 
and reframe the discussion around reintegration. 
Both Indonesia under Suharto and Malaysia with the Internal Security Act experienced 
largely repressive regimes that had little interest in any post-extremism programming beyond 
incarceration. Until about the mid-2000s in both Indonesia and Malaysia, extremists were 
frequently imprisoned indefinitely or without trial (Human Rights Watch, 2002; Human Rights 
Watch 2004). Over time, Indonesia and Malaysia experienced changes to their tactical 
approaches to countering violent extremism (Human Rights Watch, 2004). Therefore, I will 
focus on the condensed evolution of Indonesia and Malaysia’s reintegration programming 
between generally the mid-twentieth century and late 2019. Primarily, I will evaluate roughly the 
last five years (2014-2019) of adaptation since it reflects a period when literature surrounding the 
study of why terrorists leave proliferated to make reports, interviews, and recidivism rates widely 
accessible. 
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First-hand accounts of disengaged extremists by journalists and anthropologists are 
becoming more common. Anthropological studies, such as Julie Chernov-Hwang’s Why 
Terrorists Quit, which transcribes interviews she conducted with former Indonesian jihadists, 
serve as these fundamental narratives. To define the primary factors that facilitate reintegration, I 
draw from work done by experts in the field of counterterrorism such as Dr. Hwang and Dr. John 
Horgan, who both theorized about and interviewed former extremists. Others produced 
conversations with extremists and reintegration programming staff in news sources. News 
reports, including conversations with public servants, such as Ahmad El-Muhammady who 
works within the deradicalization program in Malaysia, are additional resources (Guay 2018). 
Also, I used governmental reports and policies from official state websites which include the 
Ministry of Defense from Indonesia and the Ministry of Home Affairs from Malaysia. Finally, 
sources such as the Jakarta Post and other local news entities provide primary accounts of recent 
terror attacks in Malaysia and Indonesia to allow me to characterize the changing role of women, 
children, and media in terrorism (Jones, 2018). Using these resources, I discuss the factors that 
facilitate reintegration, considering the changing face of terrorism and globalization. By 
assessing how Indonesia and Malaysia address each factor I explore potential areas of 
improvement. 
Sources used in this study come from a variety of motivations as briefly depicted above 
and with a variety of limitations. I was unable to conduct field research given the timeframe and 
resources of this project. Limited information is available in the form of robust data or 
governmental reports. Therefore, I rely on what is available in English through online sources. 
Sources such as interviews, news reports of recent terror activities, and Dr. Chernov-Hwang’s 
book represent the most direct accounts of how extremists are functioning within the two 
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societies regarding reintegration. However, they are subject to the lens of the interviewer and 
publishers and reflect a particular version of the discussion around integrating former extremists. 
I attempt to circumvent this issue by utilizing a variety of sources from various perspectives. 
Governmental reports provide representations of the programming available and goals of 
the state which allows me to evaluate the current position on reintegration and what has been 
implemented. However, the reports are often not available in English and, in Indonesia, are often 
limited as reports can emphasize the disjointed efforts across the archipelago (Suarda, 2016; 
Kurlantzick, 2018). Additionally, as Indonesia and Malaysia continue to receive international 
acclaim for their post-extremism programming, a premium is evident on publishing positively 
framed reports and this state bias also clouds the field. Similarly, secondary sources including 
scholarly articles and human rights group reports provide vital perspectives and summaries of the 
discussion surrounding former extremists. A battery of biases held by these organizations and 
actors impact certain policies or highlight goals outside of those chosen by the states. With these 
biases and limitations in mind, I use available evidence to inform and structure a qualitative 
evaluation and comparison of reintegration programs in Indonesia and Malaysia.  
 
1.4 Chapter Summaries 
Chapter 2 entails a more thorough analysis of reintegration beginning with an overview 
of the current landscape of counter-extremism. I then emphasize how reintegration programming 
is a separate entity from a deradicalization approach whereas the former is a more holistic and 
sustainable process and the latter is more difficult for states to achieve and limits potential 
impact. By discussing both the advantages and disadvantages of the two approaches, I make a 
case for why countries like Indonesia and Malaysia should pursue reintegration instead of 
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deradicalization. Furthermore, I discuss psychological research that explores why individuals 
decide to radicalize and how this information can inform programming. I also outline the factors 
that facilitate a former extremist’s reintegration, namely psychological, social, and economic 
influences as well as the role of social networks. Within the context of how such factors impact 
an individual’s return to society, I explain how successful reintegration benefits former 
extremists and their communities through a restorative justice approach in contrast to punitive 
philosophies enacted in some other countries. Chapter 2 concludes with a discussion of how the 
success of reintegration programming can be measured and the case is made for a comparative 
analysis of programming in Indonesia and Malaysia. 
         Chapter 3 provides a concentrated history of terrorism and counterterrorism in Indonesia 
and Malaysia. The timeline of events is defined in eras marked by important occurrences such as 
the repeal of the Internal Security Act in Malaysia and the establishment of a counterterrorism 
unit in Indonesia. Evolution of the counter-extremism policy in response to the globalization of 
terrorism, the return of FTFs, and the use of social networking in radicalization are described and 
evaluated. The influence of allies and international entities like the United Nations on 
programming is also considered in the context of the defined eras. Chapter 3 concludes by 
predicting the future directions of reintegration as a component of counter-extremism 
programming in Indonesia and Malaysia respectively. 
Chapter 4 begins by briefly revisiting the factors that facilitate a terrorist’s reintegration 
into society. Next, using these factors and the consideration of the changing landscapes described 
in chapter 3, I develop evaluation criteria to define the efficacy of Indonesia and Malaysia’s 
reintegration programs. The criteria involve evaluation of 7 different categories: 1. Engagement 
with non-government actors, 2. Continuity and follow-up, 3. Economic stability, 4. Inclusion of 
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age and gender support, 5. Psychological care, 6. Educational opportunities, and 7. Social 
inclusion. I discuss the extent to which Indonesia or Malaysia addresses a particular category and 
use a rating scale to quantify their success in that area. Chapter 4 also compares and contrasts 
both the success and strategies of the two countries and lastly discusses future recommendations 
for the programs. 
I will conclude in chapter 5 with a discussion on the regional implications around 
Indonesia’s and Malaysia’s programming and the role of media in reintegration. To begin, I will 
summarize the findings from the comparison and program evaluation in chapter 4 that relate to 
how other states in Southeast Asia could be impacted, especially with movements to militarize 
counterterrorism in the region. To follow, I will elaborate on the relationship between media and 
reintegration with a focus on actions taken by the Indonesian and Malaysian governments. While 
a discussion of regional impacts and media is outside the scope of my thesis, they present 
important future areas of study as they are closely intertwined with Indonesian and Malaysian 
reintegration efforts. Finally, I will summarize and reflect on my findings. 
  
  
 
19 
 
Chapter 2: Understanding Reintegration 
It’s difficult to start interacting again … if we meet someone at the market, we try to approach 
them nicely. … It was difficult but I got through it because my wife told me to be patient … 
finally after one year of seeing our behavior, those who kept their distance started to approach 
us, and we became active in the community, like participating in gotong royong  
 
Former Indonesian extremist, 20174 
 
Introduction 
 Given the global and transnational nature of modern terrorism, states face the question of 
what to do with terrorists returning home from training and extremist operations on foreign soil. 
The reintegration of these transnational extremists as well as domestic extremists requires 
development of reintegration programming within a country’s counterterrorism operations. As 
reintegration is a relatively new and understudied concept, robust research on effective 
reintegration programming or the factors that specifically influence reintegration is still young. 
This lack of exploration represents a gap in the field that must be addressed to inform and 
modify current approaches to preventing and countering extremism. Such growth in 
programming will positively inform state measures to combat violent extremism and contribute 
to larger international security initiatives. These findings hold relevance for countries attempting 
to foster domestic security, state autonomy, and ideologically balanced civil societies when faced 
with mass return of FTFs. Thus, this chapter clarifies several obstacles impeding analytical 
progress in the field of reintegration and discusses some of the key factors that facilitate 
reintegration.  
 
4 The experience was recounted by a former weapons smuggler from Indonesia. Under anti-terrorist legislation, the 
former extremist was convicted to serve about eight years in prison (Sumpter, 2018).  
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To begin, I present a brief overview of the roots and current landscape of 
counterterrorism with a focus on the discussions of countering violent extremism. Following this 
contextualization will be an analysis of reintegration as a process distinct from deradicalization 
and a discussion of the specific value of reintegration approaches to preventing violent 
extremism. Next, the chapter will examine the factors that facilitate reintegration, including the 
importance of psychology and social networks. I will also discuss how successful reintegration is 
measured. The chapter will conclude with an argument for the necessity and value of a 
comparison-based case study between Indonesian and Malaysian reintegration-style 
programming.  
 
2.1 Background  
Trends in Terrorism Research  
Traditionally, the focal point of counterterrorism efforts was the entry of individuals into 
terrorist networks and the process of radicalization. Policymakers, researchers, and intelligence 
officials alike sought to understand why and how individuals traversed the path to violent 
extremism in various contexts. While areas of study including social, economic, and cultural 
factors that facilitated radicalization, research into understanding the psychology and character of 
radicalized individuals garnered greater emphasis (Berghuis, 2018; Hwang, 2018; James, 2016; 
Silke, 2003). Thus, much of the work identified individual and collective vulnerabilities to the 
onset of extremism and analyzed how these individuals may be prevented from undertaking that 
path. While this approach to preventing violent extremism maintained scholarly attention, not as 
much work went into researching the back-end process -- why and how terrorists quit.  
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Recently, global discussions of terrorism are shifting to include the processes of terrorists 
leaving their networks, changing their roles within radical organizations, and disavowing violent 
radical ideology altogether (Horgan, 2009). The volume of coverage on radicalization research, 
according to experts, is overplayed with minimal forward progress from the literature. Thus, new 
angles must be considered to continue developing solutions and achieve further successful 
counterterrorism approaches (Silke, 2003; Hwang, 2018). Considering the path away from 
radicalization creates the potential for counterterrorism efforts to become more dynamic and 
encompass the entire life cycle of an extremist. Like previous work on radicalization, newer 
research must elaborate on how economic, social, and psychological factors impact pathways 
leading from extremism back to civil life. Overall, this repositioning of focus in the study of 
terrorism depicts a process of return to society that is highly complex, gradual, and personal. 
 
Establishing Key Terminology 
To understand the path of returning to society, I delineate the plethora of new terms 
defined and explored by scholars. Several related terms appear in the literature on criminology, 
post-combat, and addiction, illustrating key overlaps around the psychological factors that 
facilitate the reintegration process. The four salient concepts to the discussion in this analysis 
include disengagement, deradicalization, rehabilitation, and reintegration (Grip & Kotajoki, 
2019). Each of these terms represents a distinct portion of the layered process an extremist 
undergoes to rejoining a nonviolent civil society. These terms are often used interchangeably or 
ambiguously, which complicates the understanding of policy, hinders discussion within the field, 
and complicates evaluation of programming (Horgan, 2009). Thus, further clarity and consistent 
definitions of these terms are needed to not only improve insight into how and why radicalized 
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individuals change their roles or leave their organizations but to also understand which concept 
states should prioritize in their approaches to counter violent extremism. As in previous 
discussions, I will emphasize the distinctions between the terms as well as the impact of using 
deradicalization versus reintegration as the primary goal of programming, before narrowing in on 
how reintegration impacts counterterrorism efforts.  
The transition from radical ideology, terrorist networks, or other extremist groups 
involves two different processes. The first process of change a radicalized individual faces can 
be considered disengaging and/or deradicalizing. This first process can, and often does, involve 
no significant environmental change. Extremists may still hold active positions within terrorist 
networks while only undergoing any change passively. Disengagement represents a change in 
behavior that is often exemplified by violent extremists taking a more indirect role in the violent 
activities of their terror network. For example, rather than engaging directly in combat, planning, 
or the execution of violence, an extremist can disengage from this path to fund or secure supplies 
for the terrorist cell. Deradicalization, by contrast, involves a change in belief (Bjørgo & Horgan, 
2009; Hwang, 2018; See, 2018). More specifically, disengagement is primarily characterized by 
a physical and behavioral distancing from radical ideology while deradicalization is a cognitive 
shift away from radical ideology and doctrine (Koehler, 2017).  
The second process experienced by those transitioning occurs when there is a more 
drastic voluntary or involuntary environmental shift. The process catalyzes changes in behavior 
and belief that may (or may not) have begun as part of the first process. At a state level this 
process can begin when extremists are imprisoned, deported back to their communities, self-
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reported, reported by family members, or required to undergo a counter-extremist program5. One 
step in this process is rehabilitation. Despite a battery of different definitions and uses in 
literature, in the context of this thesis, rehabilitation denotes a mechanism for introducing 
positive psychological development and reconstruction in radicalized individuals with the aim of 
a paramount psychological change like deradicalization.  
Finally, and most importantly for the remainder of the chapter, is the concept of 
reintegration. The significance of reintegration is underappreciated in the current literature where 
it is often grouped with the terms discussed above (Gunaratna & Sabariah, 2019). In this thesis, I 
define reintegration as the process whereby an individual undergoes behavioral and cognitive 
changes to construct a new social identity and return successfully to a nonviolent role in society. 
  
2.2 Reintegration vs. Deradicalization 
Reintegration and deradicalization will be the focus of further analysis as they represent 
two distinct goals following involvement in radical or extremist operations. Both are integral to 
the development of counterterrorism programs, but reintegration, rather than deradicalization, 
has the greatest potential impact on counterterrorism through the prevention of recidivism. 
However, in practice reintegration is often grouped with other terms and concepts. As a result, 
the distinct importance of reintegration as a definitive step post extremism is underexplored by 
the field. Another important step is looking at reintegration as an active, instead of passive, 
process, as it is sometimes described in the literature. If reintegration is ascribed a solely passive 
 
5 Whether the shift is voluntary or involuntary on the part of the extremist may determine how and to what extent 
they can achieve success in the steps of the process. If the shift is involuntary, it is also particularly salient how the 
extremist is cared for by the state. For example, if an extremist experiences torture in state detained and possess no 
personal interest or inspiration to reintegrate, that individual may never change their radical beliefs or violent 
behavior and instead refocus it towards the state (Horgan, 2009; Hwang, 2018).   
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value to be achieved only by the arbitrary relocation of an extremist back to their home with no 
other psychological or social implications, there will not be active research or programming 
focused on this step in the post-extremism path (James, 2016). By contrast, viewing reintegration 
as an active process can improve efforts to curb recidivism directly and strengthen peaceful 
social networks through the significant personal and communal reconstruction undergone. 
Cutting through this ambiguity and creating a consistent definition is thus a major improvement 
toward a more critical analysis of government facilitated post-extremism programming taking 
place in Indonesia and Malaysia.  
Deradicalization programming is concerned with changing the deeply held beliefs of 
extremists and thus has remained a popular initiative in counterterrorism agendas. The programs 
emphasize reeducation and combating indoctrination, aspiring to change how former extremists 
view religion and justice. Using the term deradicalization in programming implies an ambition 
for the direct deterrence of violence and further radicalization, sometimes through costly and 
repressive actions (Human Rights Watch, 2004). Often in current models of state-led 
deradicalization programming a range of soft and hard approaches target the post-extremist 
population (Aoláin, 2018).  
These soft and hard approaches, which vary across countries, typically aim to 
deradicalize extremists through measures that do not directly align with solely attempting an 
ideological change. Soft approaches generally attempt to provide counsel, financial, and social 
support to those individuals impacted by extremism, assuming in return extremists will accept a 
“preferred” and nonviolent view of their religion, politics, or identity (Guay, 2018; Gunaratna & 
Sabariah, 2019; Holmer & Shtuni, 2017). Hard approaches can include imprisonment, forced 
rehabilitation, stripping citizenship, and deprivation of personal rights that expect 
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deradicalization to follow from physical removal from terror networks and in some cases 
extreme force (Aoláin, 2018; Mantu, 2018).  
However, reframing preventative measures of violent extremism to include the process of 
reintegration can create more space for actions that practically include a mix of soft and hard 
approaches. Thus, shifting and adapting these practices towards reintegration instead of 
deradicalization can more effectively reach the counterterrorism goals held by states. In brief, 
seeking to reintegrate rather than just deradicalize is a more holistic agenda to achieve the 
ultimate goal of peaceful integration into society. 
A reintegration approach to programming allows for possibilities that are not accessible 
following a strict deradicalization model. For example, even if an individual can personally 
undergo deradicalization or experience significant ideological change within the context of state 
programming, focusing only on deradicalization does not ensure the individual will be exposed 
to the depth of social and emotional support necessary to participate peacefully in society. 
Individuals who deradicalize without reintegrating can experience similar senses of social 
isolation or rejection that pulled them towards radicalization in the first place. Thus, 
deradicalization aims to change an individual’s values, while reintegration entails a holistic 
approach to cognition, social interaction, and identity (Hamid & Pretus, 2019). Neither process is 
easily achieved, but integration into society utilizes distinct factors that can be facilitated by 
state-level programming to change habits and expand one's thoughts or goals (Vedantam, 2019).  
Some advantages to reintegration versus deradicalization-focused programming can also 
be illustrated through a focus on obstacles in policymaking and enforcement of several 
counterterrorism measures. For example, passing legislation that defines what an “appropriate” 
and peaceful interpretation of Islam can be problematic, particularly in a democratic state as it 
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infringes on the separation of church and state as well as individual freedoms to choose and 
interpret religion (Holmer & Shtuni, 2017). Legislation and policy aimed at making definitive 
statements on faith or belief infringe on basic human rights and civil liberties of choice and 
personal autonomy (Dickson, 1995). Also, the heavy reliance on religious therapy to cure 
radicalization can be described as “a kind of broad-spectrum antibiotic [that] may be misplaced 
and problematic” (Holmer & Shtuni, 2017). Alternatively, reintegration policy requiring 
incarcerated extremists’ exposure to pluralism through peer discussions, diverse religious 
education, and education around social responsibilities utilizes religious perspectives to 
challenge radicalism but does not require participants to hold views directly in line with the 
government. 
States and officials running counterterrorism programs should not exclusively aim to 
change the beliefs of those individuals within their programs to a potentially politically 
influenced interpretation of faith. However, forcing individuals identified as security threats to 
participate in programs that focus on their peaceful integration and participation in society is a 
more reasonable goal. Police and some military forces are running these post-extremist programs 
following prison or as a form of reeducation forced on individuals identified as a threat to the 
state. Thus, offering an incentive of eventual positive return to society and job training remains 
advantageous over enforcement of specific interpretations of faith (Gunaratna & Sabariah, 2019; 
Veldhuis 2012). However, this endeavor should be undertaken with caution; as poorly designed 
reintegration programs may waste resources as well as increase radicalization whether through 
rejection of the program or narratives spread by extremists about the programs (Koehler, 2017).  
Reintegration tactics are often more effective in both sustaining a heterogeneous active 
civil society and protecting basic human rights (UN General Assembly, art. 18). Thus, a variety 
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of different interventions aligned with reintegration produce ideal programming that is similar to 
successful initiatives seen in criminology (Garfield, 2020). Explicitly, methods of changing 
social identity, networks, perceptions of self, and habits should be paramount in programs 
designed to engage a returning extremist population.  
 
2.3 Reintegration in Counterterrorism 
Reintegration as opposed to deradicalization is an integral portion of a state’s 
counterterrorism agenda. Reintegration can be considered to counter violent extremism in two 
major ways: by countering the grassroots spread of radical ideology and thus fracturing terrorist 
networks and decreasing the financing of terrorism. 
First, individuals who have reintegrated can be an important resource for generating 
resistance to the spread of radicalized ideology in vulnerable populations and thereby disrupt 
terror networks (Hwang, 2018; Holmer & Shtuni, 2017). Those individuals reintegrating can 
readdress their former paths of radicalization to provide mentorship and experiential knowledge 
against the use of violence (Hwang, 2018; See, 2018). Reintegration allows for those with the 
capacity and social capital to advocate for nonviolence to vulnerable youth or underrepresented 
populations through avenues traditionally closed to state officials. By providing alternative 
viewpoints with the credibility of personal knowledge, reintegrated individuals can prevent 
radicalization of more people and slow the growth of terrorist networks.  
Both Indonesia and Malaysia make use of former extremists in their reintegration 
programs. Former extremists can provide information about terrorist operations as well as work 
personally with detainees and prisoners to help change their mindset away from that of 
extremism, which is especially important because detainees are a population at risk of returning 
  
 
28 
 
to extremism or spreading their ideology (El-Said, 2012). Talking to someone who was once in 
their shoes can be a powerful tool to convince an extremist to deradicalize, and if that extremist 
chooses to reintegrate, they might in turn prevent others from radicalizing. On the other hand, if 
efforts fail the police or security forces can be aware that the individual who refused to 
reintegrate is a potential threat, thus hopefully mitigating any future violent action. An added 
benefit is that reintegration programming increases contact between extremists and police as well 
as individuals of other backgrounds, which can help break down the walls of anti-pluralist 
radical ideology.  
Education and the promotion of self-investment generated by programs aimed to 
reintegrate extremists can also curb resourcing of terrorist organizations. As extremists and 
radicalized youth populations enter into reintegration programs, they find support in securing 
employment and reprioritizing personal goals around contributing productively to their 
communities and society. Furthermore, the responsibility that reintegrated individuals feel to 
finance their former extremist networks is reduced. The financing of terrorist networks, 
particularly within Indonesia and Malaysia, is a major issue that is more recently gaining 
international legal support to criminalize (Hwang, 2018; UNODC, 2018). Generally, as 
reintegration changes one’s personal and social investments, even if that person continues to hold 
radical ideologies, they will be more likely to end financial support of extremists, progressing 
state counterterrorism goals.  
Finally, aftereffects of vigorous research and support of reintegrated extremists can 
fundamentally delineate a more full-bodied path for any extremist towards successful and 
peaceful integration into society. While this may not increase the number of extremists seeking 
reintegration, it will impact how many individuals are successful if there is a clear and deeply 
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trialed approach to the process. Long term investment into reintegration can produce a widely 
traceable journey that yields success for a variety of individuals and thus, bolsters 
counterterrorism initiatives.  
 
Context and Reintegration 
Reintegration and its role in countering violent extremism must be considered in both a 
domestic and regional context since various aspects of religion and politics can impact the 
implementation and response to programming. Indonesia and Malaysia are not alone in their 
prioritization of reintegration initiatives. Generally, Southeast Asia supports programming in-line 
with reintegration that can supplement traditional counterterrorism efforts. The backbone of such 
efforts is the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), established in 1967 to promote 
peace, stability, and strengthen cooperation. A post-9/11 declaration as well as a 2007 
convention solidified regional cooperation in counterterrorism efforts (UNODC, 2018). In 
support of deradicalization, Malaysia hosted the Conference for Deradicalisation and Countering 
Violent Extremism in January 2016 which was attended by 17 ministers and 500 representatives 
from the region to share knowledge and practices of countering ideology, community education, 
media use, as well as counseling and services to detainees (Ministry of Home Affairs, 2016).  
The study of reintegration reveals the importance of tailoring programming and 
benchmarks to the particular society (Koehler, 2017; Veldhuis 2012). Southeast Asia, in 
particular, is an important region in which to study transnational terrorism, given the fluidity of 
terror networks through Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines (Borelli, 2017). Collaboration 
is a hallmark of international security in this region. Hence, the integration of extremists in 
Indonesia must work with the dismantling and countering of radicalization in Malaysia to 
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disenfranchise the various terrorist networks within the region. Radicalization is a pervasive 
process and can insert itself into any part of society.  
In Indonesia and Malaysia, religious schools, community groups, prayer networks, and 
online forums all serve as spaces where those who are radicalized can spread their ideologies. 
Extremists often train in one country and commit acts of violence in or send capital to another as 
most terrorist networks operate transnationally. For example, recent unrest in Marawi Philippines 
and security threats to Singapore and southern Thailand are linked to terrorists participating in 
the Jemaah Islamiyah and Daesh related networks present in Indonesia and Malaysia (Tan, 
2018). Therefore, as these security threats and networks remain fluid throughout the region, so 
must measures and collaboration efforts surrounding countering violent extremism. The 
complexity of transnational terrorism includes foreign incarceration and repatriation of FTFs as 
these groups must be incorporated into the system of reintegration.  
Programming must also be tailored to the demographics of extremists. The conversation 
around extremist demographics in Indonesia and Malaysia recently reignited as women and 
children are increasingly involved in terrorist activities in the region. As a result, authorities are 
faced with a challenge to address populations of varying age and gender identities. Importantly, a 
one-size-fits-all approach that envisions an extremist to be only an adult male is not adequate to 
reintegrate extremists into society. Women may become radicalized due to different factors than 
men (Mahmood, 2019). Additionally, women face different experiences, abuses, responsibilities, 
and play different roles in extremist groups that require distinct approaches to combat their 
radicalization and involvement in the network (Santos, 2019).  
Age is another consideration, primarily when it comes to children. For example, young 
children or adolescents may be more susceptible to indoctrination of radical beliefs or beliefs that 
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violence is an effective tactic to get what you want. Given their vulnerability to growing up into 
radicalization and be used in terrorist activity even without indoctrination, children may also not 
fully understand the consequences of their actions (Beech & Suhartono, 2019). Special care must 
be taken to understand the cognitive and psychological state of children involved in extremist 
activities and how to best help them reconcile and reintegrate into a nonviolent society they may 
have never really known. In short, extremists of different gender identities and ages face a 
diverse set of obstacles to reintegration and successful programming must consider their needs 
(Nemr et al, 2018).  
Moreover, the inclusion of extremists who fight or train transnationally into programs of 
reintegration provides domestic safeguards against violent tactics and ideologies learned abroad. 
For example, experts speculate that the release of FTFs from prison increases radicalization and 
recruitment of more terrorists in their home countries (Schulze, 2018; See, 2018). Reintegration 
allows for states to further secure their borders and share strong enforcement as the approach 
works to weaken transnational terrorist organizations by generating more nonviolent paths from 
extremism. By addressing FTFs directly through reintegration programming, Southeast Asian 
states engage in protecting their populations and others in the region. But, to reap these 
counterterrorism and international security advantages achieved through reintegration 
programming, there must be an understanding of the psychological factors that facilitate 
extremists’ reintegration into society.   
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2.4 Psychology of Reintegration 
Shared Trauma  
Experiencing the process of reintegration is not exclusive to extremists, rather it is a form 
of personal and social development that different populations exposed to significant 
psychological and physical stresses undergo. In this section, I will explain how the process of 
reintegration by multiple parties contributes to a community of peace. Examining reintegration 
as a path through shared traumas provides insight into the hardships faced by extremists both 
within and beyond terrorist networks. Such insights can then be drawn out of the process to 
impact the way states think about push and pull factors of radicalization, illustrating how 
undergoing reintegration can improve counterterrorism efforts more generally. Addicts, 
incarcerated individuals, soldiers, and victims exposed to trauma, harm, or stress wishing to 
return to society all face their form of reintegration. These paths of reintegration present a large 
body of research that addresses complex relationships between individuals and society as well as 
mind and body (Bazemore, 1998; Belrose et al, 2018; James 2016). Additionally, reintegrated 
individuals in these fields are commonly called on to contribute to the upkeep of these 
reintegration style programs (Hamidi, 2016; Rucktäschel, 2019). Drawing on these diverse 
experiences serves as evidence towards promoting the reintegration of extremists, as extremists 
navigate similar obstacles to others in the community and can also repurpose their experiences 
positively.  
Prisoners, soldiers, victims, and extremists must redefine their identity and undergo 
cognitive growth to function peacefully in society. Often the path of an extremist and criminal 
overlaps through similar experiences with legal, social, and financial ramifications from 
imprisonment plus bodily trauma from detention (Garfield, 2020). Furthermore, the discussion of 
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whether rights to reform and reintegrate should be offered to terrorists despite the severity of 
crimes committed is an important conversation to acknowledge due to the scope and intensity of 
violence around extremism.   
Returning extremists and soldiers most commonly carry psychological and neuronal 
impacts of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and other subsequent effects of their actions. 
There are numerous cases of returning soldiers and civilians exposed to combat diagnosed with 
PTSD or similar anxiety disorders (Digangi et al, 2018). Impacts on the psychological state of 
extremists are under-recorded and then under-addressed or unaccounted for in counterterrorism 
programs. Nurshardrina Khairadhinia (Nur), for example, experienced psychological harm after 
being tempted towards radical ideology over the internet. Nur convinced her family to follow her 
to Syria in 2015. She believed in the financial and religious prosperity available under the 
caliphate depicted by the ISIS fabricated media (Harty, 2017). However, once in Syria, her 
family was picked apart by death, detention, and the subjugation of women. Nur experienced a 
deep sense of shame from feeling as though she caused her own family’s peril at the hands of 
this falsified Islamic haven. The immense guilt and humiliation combined with her forced 
marriage illustrate the sort of psychological harm those who are exposed to extremism face. 
Additionally, her story continues as Nur and her family remain in Kurdish controlled territory 
awaiting ramifications from the Indonesian government. Nur expresses deep regret as her male 
family members still face the possibility of death by Syrian soldiers or Shiite militias (Harty, 
2017). 
Lastly, victims of violent crimes may often need to reconstruct their identity and sense of 
self to function in society, actions that former extremists must undergo to similarly reconcile 
changes in their beliefs and values (Hwang, 2018; Žukauskienė et al, 2019). Thus, reintegration 
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is not exclusive to the experience of terrorists, radicals, or any of the aforementioned groups. For 
many groups, reintegration plays a crucial role in personal well-being as well as the safety of 
others. For example, successful reintegration can dampen further radicalization, deter re-offense, 
and protect potentially vulnerable members in the community. By understanding the 
psychological and physical experiences shared by extremists, prisoners, victims, and soldiers 
more can be understood and measured about how individuals reintegrate and how programs may 
succeed. Development of reintegration methods intended to assist soldiers, criminals, and victims 
produce lessons that will inform extremist reintegration.  
 
Factors That Facilitate Reintegration 
The reintegration of extremists is a gradual, multifaceted, and complex process. Some of 
the factors that facilitate integration into society, including financial, social, and psychological 
factors, might be similar to those that catalyzed radicalization originally (Jaffer, 2019). While a 
focus on individual variations and psychological principles have not always been central to 
reintegration programming, these aspects now dominate studies of extremist populations 
(Horgan 2009; Veldhuis 2012; Koehler 2017). The inclusion of a behavioral neuroscience 
perspective denotes a crucial development in the field because the intersectionality of security 
and psychological concerns crucially influences the process of reintegration (Hwang 2018). 
Factors commonly associated with reintegration such as social or familial relationships 
ultimately tie into an individual’s psychology and mental state.  
Moreover, disposition directly affects executive processing and the capacity to reintegrate 
or re-radicalize. For instance, some individuals join extremist groups to gain a sense of belonging 
and community (Hwang, 2018). The counter to facilitate the reintegration of such individuals 
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would require fostering a new sense of belonging, community, and connection outside of the 
extremist network. Thereby addressing a psychological and socially motivated drive that first led 
to radicalization (Jaffer, 2019). The following factors represent the nuanced components from a 
broad evaluation of current published cases and narratives that impact reintegration. These 
conditions are numerous and complex, with most falling under economic, psychological, and 
social factors (Hwang, 2018; Hamid & Pretus, 2019; Jaffer, 2019; Silke 2003).  
Some extremists join terrorist networks due to financial factors, and likewise economic 
obstacles may encourage them to rejoin after release from prison or return from conflict. For 
example, former extremists may be blacklisted by banks or places of employment due to legal 
repercussions of their charges (Guay, 2018). These obstacles during reintegration create financial 
insecurity that impacts extremists as well as their families and communities. Economic stability 
is a crucial factor in reintegration as without support, returning to financial security within their 
terrorist networks is likely (Guay, 2018). Moreover, the sense of purpose and independence that 
comes from gainful employment and financial security may be key for some individuals who 
undergo reintegration. 
Psychological factors around reintegration are similarly crucial to comprehend. Ibrahim, 
a former extremist, at seventeen traveled to fight in Syria. In 2013, Ibrahim returned to Denmark 
and was immediately turned into the police by his father. Through the Aarhus model in Denmark 
that works with a direct counseling approach, Ibrahim met with a volunteer mentor who gained 
his trust and exposed him to diverse perspectives (Jeffer, 2019). The psychological aspect of 
reintegration, while complex and personal, may involve religious and family counseling, 
rehabilitation, or broad education aimed at expanding restricted and persistent thought patterns 
held by extremists (Koehler, 2017). Psychological programming may involve meditations on 
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how one interprets their religion, morals, social justice, or even how to interact with a former 
radical associate should they run into them (Koehler, 2017; Mullins, 2010).  
Within these psychological considerations, it is important to study how various identities 
held by extremists impact their needs in reintegration programming. For example, individuals of 
different ages and genders may experience distinct harm within and challenges to their path out 
of extremism. Women may radicalize for different reasons than men as uncovered by modern 
gender studies on radicalization (Santos, 2019; Zakuan, 2018).  Women are also exposed to 
particularly harmful performances of gendered roles in radical groups by forced marriage and   
“grooming their children to become future militants” (Santos, 2019) Thus, women may require 
different resources and strategies to reintegrate as they face these experiences. Psychological, 
medical, and social needs all can differ between a male and female detainee and all factors ought 
to be addressed (International Civil Society Action Network, 2019). Likewise, child extremists 
vary in their understanding and recognition of their indoctrination, family terrorist activity, and 
potential for successful reintegration (Beech & Suhartono, 2019). Children in extremist families 
need more mentorship, educational opportunities, and warrant specific attention as well as 
resources. In short, it is imperative to keep identities including age and gender in the 
conversation of factors driving reintegration and evaluation of programming.   
Concurrently, researchers have utilized advanced imaging to understand radicalization in 
the minds of extremists. Recently, Hamid and Pretus recruited young radicals in Barcelona and 
used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) scans to study brain activity while they 
performed tasks. The researchers also sampled their population to gauge extremist values and 
establish relevant psychological measures. Participants scored normally on scales of personality, 
IQ, and mental illness when compared to non-radicalized populations. This finding is integral in 
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its support of previous knowledge that these factors alone are not prevalent in radicalization 
(Hamid & Pretus, 2019).   
Social factors of connection and exclusion were also explored using a virtual passing 
game. Half of the 538 participants were socially excluded by virtual players. This experiment, 
though basic, tested the concept of sacred values. Sacred values illustrate the overlap between 
social and psychological factors that influence one's capacity to shift ideology and identity 
towards nonviolence during reintegration. Hamid and Pretus define sacred values as non-
negotiable values that people will fight for if they feel their value is threatened (Hamid & Pretus, 
2019). Their results predicted that individuals who were socially excluded and identified with 
extremist views treated more of their radical values as sacred. Ultimately, they were more likely 
to report they would fight or die for their beliefs than those who were included. The study 
suggests that social exclusion can contribute to hardening of values or willingness to engage in 
violence to achieve a sense of visibility or personally devised justice. Such an individual may be 
led to choose a radical path when met with radical indoctrination, financial, and psychological 
pull factors. Similarly, the research suggests inclusion and reframing of how these individuals 
advocate for their beliefs or identity can facilitate reintegration by changing their avenues of 
expression from violence to activism or service. 
Another social implication of the study detailed how radical individuals moderated their 
willingness to fight and die for their values relative to the opinions of their peers (Hamid & 
Pretus, 2019). Thus, removing individuals from the environment of violent extremists and 
terrorist networks may encourage disengagement and movement towards a successful return to 
society. Social support and positive relationships between family and new friends are an 
important aspect of deradicalization and reintegration. Policies aimed at social inclusion, 
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purposefulness, and social support of communities that incorporate individuals exiting 
extremism also prove valuable to countering terrorism (Koehler, 2017; Hamid & Pretus, 2019). 
However, limiting social exposure to government facilitated reeducation and online messaging 
that oppose extremism lacks the same social salience (Sumpter, 2018). These factors and others 
illustrate how reintegration can be achieved through fulfillment of basic human needs. 
Other factors that promote and contribute to the process of reintegration underly recent 
studies of habits and unconscious behavior. Habits are built generally from repeated actions in a 
given context that are rewarded. These behaviors eventually become automatic and are 
challenging to alter or reform (Wood, 2019; Neal et al, 2011). These habitual behaviors are not 
reliant on active decision making. Therefore, we must reintroduce intention and executive 
processing to the context to change these sorts of autonomous behaviors. Extremists would 
require a well-structured environment that allows untargeted behaviors to remain automated, so 
they can concentrate decision processing around target behaviors. Increasing obstacles or friction 
to complete habits forces individuals to apply attention to the unconscious behaviors that 
establish a distinct lifestyle and make changes driven by active choice. Conversely, promoting 
healthy and desired behaviors means decreasing frictions (or obstacles to completing a given 
behavior) and increasing the ease to reward (Wood, 2019). Reintegration programming must 
make it easy to perform and be rewarded for these goal behaviors.  
Particularly, this facilitation is required because extremists who seek to build a renewed 
social identity and purpose will need to substantially change their radical behaviors and thoughts, 
which may be habitual. Thus, well planned and structured programming is necessary to limit the 
decision making to key behaviors that will best garner successful reintegration, nonviolent 
problem solving, active critical thinking, and social engagement with nonviolent peers. Other 
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findings regarding brain plasticity and learning suggest lifelong learning and change in cognition 
is possible, however, the adult brain does not change as robustly as it does in younger individuals 
(Pauwels et al, 2018). Following this logic, reintegration programming that strongly targets the 
treatment of younger radicals and increasingly addresses vulnerable youth populations has 
greater potential to successfully integrate. Overall, factors that psychologically facilitate 
reintegration are continually being researched and developed as human behavior and cognitive 
development interlace over terrorism. This development indicates states must marry policy and 
the individual to combine neuroscience, psychology of mental health, and social behavior with 
reintegration. 
 Media and social networking exposure are an aspect of counterterrorism deserving of 
more discussion because of their ability to prevent radicalization and return to violent extremism. 
Strong bonds to family and friends prevent people from joining illegal activities according to 
social bond theory and many who recidivate are found to maintain no significant outside social 
network (Berghuis 2018; Hwang, 2018). While social networks may be an important factor for 
most individuals, that does not mean everyone experiencing reintegration holds the same social 
needs. Research suggests that humans are driven to group people based on almost exclusively 
social information and thus, desire membership in groups they identify as ingroups. (Brewer, 
1979; Tajfel et al, 1971). The groupings are designed arbitrarily and almost entirely learned, 
permitting fluidity in group membership and interest by changes to an individual’s priorities or 
prior affiliation (Jhangiani & Tarry 2018). An extremist may lose their sense of membership 
when reintegrating and if these needs are not addressed, a former extremist met with social 
isolation and rejection can return to the social support of their extremist organization. These 
organizations on a global scale are persuasive and accessible at all times on the internet, thus 
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such a relapse is possible with poor enforcement or resourcing of reintegration programming that 
addresses the social needs of radicalized individuals (Hwang, 2018).  
Finally, the factors that underly reintegration compose the evaluation of Indonesia and 
Malaysia’s post-extremism programming in chapter 4. The table below indicates how some of 
the main factors will be drawn on from this discussion to support an exploration of specific state 
initiatives.  
 
Table 1: Factors That Facilitate Reintegration  
Factor for Evaluation Definition 
 
Engagement with Non-Government Actors 
 
Cooperation between government and NGOs or civil 
society organizations 
 
Continuity and Follow up 
 
Quality of longitudinal tracking and support after release 
from prison or state program care 
 
Economic Stability 
 
Support to find and secure a job/career plus establish 
financial independence 
 
Inclusion of Age and Gender Support 
Extent of specialized programming and resources available 
to address concerns of those with different ages and gender 
identities 
 
Psychological Care 
 
Counseling/therapy provided to both extremist and their 
family to facilitate the development of a new identity 
 
Educational Opportunity 
 
Extent of access to quality education or vocational training 
for individuals undergoing reintegration 
 
Social Inclusion 
 
Extent of community outreach to help former extremists 
return to a society that accepts them 
 
The Restorative Nature of Reintegration 
The factors underlying reintegration address more than a discussion of the individual and 
their development, as it embraces a discussion of broader reconciliation. Facing people that we 
harmed or re-experiencing personal trauma are indisputably immense challenges. However, the 
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challenge can empower victims and perpetrators toward healing and possibly create a path 
toward growth. This process depicts the concept of restorative justice and has been put into 
practice by Common Justice, a New York-based organization led by Danielle Sered. Sered 
defines restorative justice as a process of accepting accountability and making amends where the 
individuals most impacted meet to agree on the conditions of reparations and restoration 
(Garfield, 2020). Restorative justice is a model that challenges systems of classical punishment. 
Restorative justice, in a similar way to reintegration, evolves and adapts to the needs of the 
victims, involving many conditions including community service, higher education, restitution, 
seeking employment, and more. In a recent interview, Sered referred to a criminal system built 
on poorly enforced deterrence as “trying to solve a thousand different problems with a single 
tool” rather than using a variety of different interventions specific to each healing and truth 
(Garfield, 2020).  
In terms of extremism, a restorative justice methodology is practical within the 
framework of reintegration. Reintegration is an essential aspect of the healing process for both 
extremists and affected communities (Samuel, 2016; Veldhuis 2012). Instead of only treating 
extremists with prison time, promoting reconciliation through reintegration will allow 
community members to engage with each other, particularly those with different beliefs, civil, 
and political identities. Such an approach would also address one of the reasons individuals 
become radicalized. For example, some people turn to extremism when they feel that they lack a 
voice. Restorative justice through reintegration gives communities and radicalized youth a 
process towards truth and understanding that there are other methods to self-advocacy besides 
violence (Hamid & Pretus, 2019). This path is not available within deradicalization programming 
which places its focus on changing a terrorist’s internal ideology. Contrastingly, reintegration 
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provides space for restorative justice to focus on broader healing as extremists and community 
members reconstruct social bonds.  
Structuring a path for extremists back to their home communities is not without 
difficulty. The process is especially laborious in Southeast Asian countries that have experienced 
attacks by radicalized individuals within their borders as well as records of ethnic and religious 
unrest (Counter Extremism Project, 2019). However, with reintegration there can be positive 
development within communities to accept those active in the reintegration process, preventing 
rejection of the returning extremist that could spark subsequent re-radicalization6 (Veldhuis, 
2012). While applying restorative justice outside of lower-level criminal offenses is challenging 
because of possible threats to security or scope of violence, its role in reintegration represents a 
paramount facet of social inclusion and community restoration. 
 
2.5 Measuring Success   
Reception and Commitment 
Reintegration is not valued equally across the world, which is evidenced by the program 
design, resource allocation, and legal framework present in different states. Malaysia and 
Indonesia serve as examples of countries that highly value approaches to engage former 
extremists. They institute diverse programming, gain frequent international recognition of their 
counterterrorism approaches, and invest in collaboration (Koehler, 2017; Holmer & Shtuni, 
2017; Gunaratna & Sabariah, 2019). Malaysia’s former Special Branch director, Datuk Seri 
 
6 Certain individuals took up their own form of justice at a community level through relationships between families 
of victims and perpetrators. An example of this personal reconciliation occurred after the 2002 Bali bombings when 
a unique but positive relationship developed in Indonesia between a widow of a bombing victim and a former 
bombmaker whose brother actively participated in the attacks (Gelineau, 2019).   
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Muhammad Fuzi Harun, self-reported a 95% success rate in its deradicalization programming 
citing only 13 of 240 cases of reoffense, although the lack of major terrorist attacks in the 
country could also serve as an objective measure of success (Koehler, 2017). The country’s 
approach includes four objectives: to correct misconstrued Islamic teachings, to identify a 
detainee’s understanding of Islam, teach awareness of the responsibility of Malaysian citizens, 
and explain to the detainee that their actions are counter to Islam (Guaratna & Sabariah, 2019; 
Nemr et al, 2018). Indonesia also utilizes a religious counseling approach but provides this 
service to detainees’ families to create a common understanding of religion in support of 
detainees’ release which illustrates a model much closer to reintegration (Guaratna & Sabariah, 
2019). Also, in the last ten years new programming launched that seeks to integrate voices from 
plural Islamic religious groups, victims of terrorist violence, and universities into the states’ 
approaches to counter violent extremism (Nemr et al, 2018). Thus, Malaysia and Indonesia 
represent two states in a key region to the conversation of transnational terrorism that actively 
seek to counter violent extremism through post-extremist programming.  
The approaches utilized by Indonesia and Malaysia contrast with a commonplace 
philosophy of how extremists are treated in Western countries. In the United Kingdom and 
France, for example, deprivation of citizenship and punishment of those found guilty of 
extremism are more common while holistic approaches are scarcer (Mantu, 2018). Furthermore, 
while Indonesia and Malaysia continue to emphasize and support their deradicalization 
programming, some of their allies do less. Australia’s programs are criticized as ineffective, the 
United States has lengthened prison sentences for terrorists and in 2017 France closed its only 
center for deradicalization of Islamic extremists (Suratman, 2017). Researchers such as Kern 
(2017) and McAuley (2017) question whether the program failed because of poor execution or 
  
 
44 
 
poor prisoner participation. One author raised concerns that so-called deradicalization programs 
cannot work in the West because the directed target of Jihadist movements is often Western 
populations (Spencer, 2017). Nevertheless, different parts of the world are tackling 
counterterrorism in a variety of ways. Indonesia and Malaysia choose to build programs of 
deradicalization to a greater extent than Western states. Therefore, deeper evaluation of their 
programs against the process and efficiency of reintegration presents an important study of 
counterterrorism measures with global implications. 
 
Tools of Measurement 
An issue that arises alongside this discussion is how to determine and accurately measure 
the success of reintegration programming. Currently, recidivism rates serve as the primary metric 
of success for reintegration programs (Mullins, 2010). While recidivism rates can represent an 
important and useful measure of program success by representing how often those passing 
through a program experience rearrests, reconviction or reincarceration, accurate data collection 
is challenging and incomplete (Berghuis, 2018).  For example, recidivism rates can exclude 
extremists reoffending without persecution and individuals who commit criminal offenses 
outside of terrorist activities. More importantly, recidivism does not measure deradicalization. 
Recidivism is limited as a quantitative measurement of reintegration that cannot capture the 
qualitative nature of psychological, economic, or social change undergone by a reintegrated 
extremist. Additional measurements of active participation in civil society, education, and 
employment would serve as an effective supplement to recidivism rates to determine the efficacy 
of reintegration programming (Veldhuis 2012).  
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However, recidivism is the main metric of success present in the study of reintegration. 
Therefore, any research on the efficacy of reintegration must incorporate other metrics, 
especially measures from community groups, to understand over- and underestimating produced 
by state reported recidivism alone. But the limitations of assessing and understanding recidivism 
suggest how challenging it is to produce complete measures of success around counterterrorism. 
This discussion also highlights that the shortcomings of post-extremism programs and success 
measurements, which lack depth and complete evaluation, must be acknowledged by states to 
push the field forward in constructing more effective metrics of successful reintegration. 
 
Conclusion 
Reintegration programming can play an important role in a country’s counterterrorism 
operations as it facilitates the transition of radicalized individuals away from terrorist activities 
and prevents the spread of or a return to extremist ideology and behavior. Reintegration is 
facilitated in part by psychological, social, and economic factors and thus successful 
programming needs adequate resources and thoughtful design to address these areas while being 
cognizant of the individual needs of those in the program.  
Due to inconsistencies in definitions and a lack of proven methodology to evaluate the 
effectiveness of reintegration programming, researchers and states are challenged to make 
substantial claims about which programs are most successful and why. However, a comparative 
case study of the Malaysian and Indonesian reintegration programs is a step in the right direction. 
Analyzing the features of these two countries’ programs gives insight into key factors facilitating 
reintegration in each country and exposes areas that can be improved domestically and 
regionally. Additionally, while domestic social structures will still need to be considered, the 
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evaluation produced by comparing Indonesia and Malaysia’s reintegration approaches can 
exemplify why similar reintegration programs should be modeled in Western countries as well to 
replace current ineffective hard approaches taken by some nations.7  
 
 
  
 
7 Western countries often use citizenship revocation as a deterrent/punishment. This approach does not stop all 
individuals wishing to return and may push some towards re-radicalization or committing attacks in their home 
country. Other hard approaches include the U.S. increasing prison sentences for terrorism or attempting to curb 
radicalization by banning Muslims from entry. Recently, France followed the hard approach trend in Western 
countries by closing its deradicalization program (Benton & Banulescu, 2019; Suratman, 2017). 
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Chapter 3: The State and Reintegration 
 
The answer lies not in pouring more soldiers into the jungle, but in the hearts and minds of the 
Malayan people 
 
British General Sir Gerard Templer, 19528 
Introduction 
 Indonesia and Malaysia’s reintegration programs develop against an ever-evolving 
landscape of terrorism that creates various pressures on the countries to constantly rework 
approaches to counter-extremism and security. The challenges of these dynamic threats influence 
shifts in domestic politics, regional cooperation, and international partnerships. For example, the 
developmental trajectory of ISIS, the growing use of social media, and the most recent wave of 
returning FTFs from Syria to Indonesia and Malaysia pressured the states to reconceptualize 
their counterterrorism policies. Such adaptations are not limited to military strategy, rather they 
encompass more diverse efforts to prevent violent extremism like reintegration. Analyzing the 
progression of terrorism alongside its implications for domestic and international policy provides 
a crucial context in which to evaluate counterterrorism policy. Specifically, this chapter will give 
an abridged history of extremism and counterterrorism in Indonesia and Malaysia since the start 
of the 20th century alongside an exploration of the role reintegration programming plays in 
countering violent extremism.  
The chapter begins by separately dissecting the last several decades of Indonesia’s and 
Malaysia’s counterterrorism history into eras framed by cornerstone policies or laws. 
 
8  General Templer was quoted by Sergio Miller in a study on the psychological aspects of the war waged during the 
Malayan Emergency (Friedman, 2006).  
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Subsequently, trends in terrorism, as well as the general regional or international responses, will 
be analyzed for each era. I specifically include changes in counterterrorism programming, 
variations in extremist demographics, government turnover, and interaction with NGO and 
community groups over the eras. As the formulation of these eras is central to understanding the 
development of reintegration approaches in each country, I argue that this history illustrates how 
different catalysts produce various levels of state commitment to a reintegration approach. 
Additionally, utilizing this era system I will touch on how colonization impacted future state 
responses to extremism. Lastly, the chapter concludes by identifying the current state 
reintegration programming in the counterterrorism landscape of both Indonesia and Malaysia.  
 
3.1 Indonesia 
Era 1: Reintegration Under Suharto  
 The first era I will discuss encapsulates a period of Suharto’s rule over Indonesia, which 
began in the 1960s and ended with his resignation in 1998. Suharto’s presidency is defined by 
authoritarianism, censorship, oppression of political opponents, and disregard for civil liberties 
(McLeod, 2000). The strong-handed military successfully suppressed extremist movements in 
Indonesia and groups such as Darul Islam were forced to exist underground (Counter Extremism 
Project, 2019; Sumpter, 2018). The political suppression of Indonesian terrorist networks was in 
part a result of Suharto’s New Order policy in 1982 and 1983. The policy forced Islamic 
organizations to adopt a single Pancasila9 ideology. This policy created friction with 
 
9 Pancasila serves as the philosophical foundation of the Indonesian state. The Sanskrit word translates to five 
principles: belief in only one God, a just and civilized humanity, Indonesian unity, interaction between 
representatives producing inner wisdom to guide democracy, and social justice for all Indonesians (Department of 
Information, 1996). Suharto used Pancasila to punish those who disagreed with him and accusations of being anti-
Pancasila could result in loss of employment and imprisonment (Coca, 2018). 
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fundamentalist and extremist Islamic groups by attempting to secularize the country and forbid 
political parties to be based on religion (Crossette, 1985). The ideology limited the politically 
permissive extremist interpretations of Islam for some Islamic organization as the government 
applied a blanketed suppression of most political opposition movements.  
Therefore, unable to flourish on a large scale in Indonesia, many extremists went 
underground or fled elsewhere in South and Southeast Asia to train. A prominent example 
includes how Abu Bakar Bashir and Abdullah Sungkar, founders of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), 
leveraged al-Qaeda connections for resources and training in Afghanistan before the terrorist 
organization was forced to move to the Philippines in the early 1990s (USINDO, 2011). JI 
extremists who had traveled between Indonesia and South Asia or the Middle East and those 
who continued to travel between Indonesia and the Philippines illustrate an earlier wave of FTFs 
in the region. These FTFs would likely have benefitted from opportunities for reintegration but 
faced mostly indefinite incarceration following persecution causing a history of rippling 
radicalization and allegiances to international terrorist networks in the region.  
Although impactful by countering extremist movements with state repression and 
incarceration, Suharto’s tactics came with significant costs. For one, his strong-arm military 
approach was indiscriminate. The government targeted any opposition, regardless of whether 
they intended violent extremism or advocated for the expansion of civil liberties. The Indonesian 
government detained, tortured, and even killed pro-independence activists in East Timor and 
murdered students at the Trisakti University protest in 1998, triggering further deadly riots 
(Aschenbach, 1992; Yulisman, 2018). Beyond horrendous stories of human rights abuses, the 
negative impacts of the brutal counterterrorism approach lasted beyond Suharto’s seven-term 
rule. After his resignation in 1998, extremists from Indonesia were attracted back to their home 
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country by instability surrounding democratization and proliferated into a variety of militant 
groups from earlier terrorist networks. No longer oppressed by Suharto, jihadists emboldened by 
Al Qaeda’s prominence and years of pent-up aggression towards the state, unleashed organized 
violent extremism on Indonesia (Counter Extremism Project, 2019; Sumpter, 2018).  
 Thus, the period surrounding Suharto’s rule can be analyzed as a distinct time in 
Indonesia’s counterterrorism history. The era demonstrates the results of a repressive, military-
driven, and authoritarian approach to suppressing extremism as well as coinciding collateral 
damage to human rights and freedoms. At the same time, the government used no notable 
programs to holistically integrate former extremists into society. The lack of such programming 
or facilitation further illustrates that Suharto’s hardline military approach to counterterrorism was 
not robust. Examining this era demonstrates that such a limited approach to countering violent 
extremism is not effective, contained no official level of reintegration efforts, and drastically 
crippled Indonesia’s long-term domestic security.  
 
Era 2: Reintegration Following Suharto and During Democratization 
 The second era of Indonesian counterterrorism begins with Suharto’s resignation in 1998 
and ends in 2009 following major shifts in terrorist activity in Indonesia. This period marks 
Indonesia’s initial steps in democratization. While Suharto’s successor B.J. Habibie pushed 
Indonesia toward democracy, the country was plagued by ethnic violence, restriction of 
movement, and human rights violations, all of which were problems produced and fertilized 
from the Suharto era (Coppel, 2008; Human Rights Watch, 2003). Furthermore, Indonesia also 
faced the security threat of returning extremists shut out by Suharto. In 1999, these individuals 
and networks infused violence and extremism into ongoing conflicts in the Maluku Islands, 
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which spread to Sulawesi, exacerbating an already volatile situation10 (Sumpter, 2018). In 2000, 
the terrorist group JI launched its first major attack, bombing 28 churches in Jakarta and the 
islands of Sumatra and Java. The devastating operation, led by Hambali, JI’s military leader 
affiliated with Al-Qaeda, killed 19 people and injured over 120 (Counter Extremism Project, 
2019).  
The devastating attack serves as an example of the transition and turmoil marking the 
period between Suharto’s resignation and the Bali Bombings. Indonesia struggled to find its 
footing in democracy as those repressed and harmed by authoritarian rule struggled and fought to 
be a part of the restructuring of Indonesia. Additionally, Indonesia faced economic challenges, 
protests, government corruption, ethnic violence. For approximately the first time in three 
decades, the country experienced violent extremism at the hands of JI members and extremists 
returning from the Philippines and Afghanistan. Challenges such as the rise of extremist factions, 
mass atrocities, and humanitarian emergencies are common dangers to a democratizing state. 
Indonesia faced all of these problems (Baker, 2011). Furthermore, the rise of extremists was 
empowered by the loosening grip of previous military suppression under authoritarian rule. The 
built-up pressure released when extremists and violent opposition to the state could more openly 
express desires for political power in Indonesia. The period serves as an example of challenges 
married to democratization and is an illustration of how military suppression of terrorism can 
eventually backfire. While the 2000 JI church bombings mark the country’s first major attack, 
 
10 Laskar Jihad is an extremist Islamic group that operated in Maluku, Indonesia starting in 2000 and received support 
from the military during local ethnic tensions between Christians and Muslims. The group attacked Christians and burnt 
down churches in Maluku, Sulawesi, and eventually as far as Papua and Aceh. President Abdurrahman Wahid declared 
martial law to curb the violence, but many claim the military and police allowed violence to occur. By the end of the 
conflict, 9,000 people died, and hundreds of thousands lost their homes (Schulze, 2002). 
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the 2002 Bali Bombings launched violent extremism into the forefront of Indonesian security 
policy.  
 On 12 October 2002, JI terrorists bombed the Sari Club and Paddy’s, two popular 
nightclubs on the island of Bali, killing over 200 people. The devastating nature of an attack on 
the country’s largest tourist area and the severity of the death toll elicited a strong reaction from 
Indonesia. The state was forced to recognize that a counterterrorism strategy was an urgent 
priority (Rucktäschel & Schuck, 2019). Terrorist attacks continued to escalate after 2002 and the 
theme of bombing civilian targets became commonplace. In August 2003, a car bomb outside a 
Marriott hotel in Jakarta killed 12 people and wounded 150 others (Bradsher, 2003). The police 
and state officials attributed the attack to JI. Thus, President Megawati Sukarnoputri issued the 
Anti-Terrorism Law which passed in 2003, providing the government with more power to 
investigate and convict terrorists (Counter Extremism Project, 2019).  
 Looking at the major terrorist attacks Indonesia faced in the first decade of the 2000s11, 
two themes emerge. First, each attack involved utilizing the large-scale tactic of bombing and the 
targets were almost always highly populated civilian areas like hotels12. The change in tactic 
illustrates a shift towards unprovoked targeting of civilian and foreign tourist populations rather 
than extremist violence remaining largely responsive to ethnic tensions across Indonesia. 
Second, the government suspected JI was behind almost every attack which contributed to 
speculations that some of the prominent extremist networks were strengthening in Indonesia 
 
11 In Fall 2004, a bomb outside the Australian embassy killed 10 people ahead of elections in Indonesia and 
Australia (Counter Extremism Project, 2019). Bali suffered more tragedy in 2005 when 20 people died and 100 were 
injured by suicide bombers at a Four Seasons hotel and a shopping square (Counter Extremism Project, 2019). 
Finally, in July 2009 two hotels in Jakarta’s business district were attacked by suicide bombers, killing 8 people 
(Counter Extremism Project, 2019). All attacks were attributed to JI and the state’s response marked the beginning 
of a new era in Indonesian extremism and government antiterrorism policy.  
12 Except for the embassy bombing which was not as traditional of a civilian hotspot.  
  
 
53 
 
(Vaughn et al, 2005; Owen, 2017). The Indonesian government responded to these key shifts by 
establishing organizations to combat the rising extremism. After the 2002 Bali bombings, a 
special anti-terror unit of the police force called Densus 88 was formed in 2003 to pursue 
suspected terrorists (Rucktäschel & Schuck, 2019). While the creation of Densus 88 was a 
successful and a strong initial step to combating terrorism, continued attacks forced the 
government to further refine its approach. A major positive step occurred with the formation of 
The National Agency for Combating Terrorism (BNPT) in 2009 after the Jakarta hotel 
bombings. The BNPT represents the first time that police, intelligence services, and military 
combined for a more coordinated and stronger national counterterrorism strategy. Thus, the era 
exemplifies low-level efforts towards reaching effective reintegration programming. In this way, 
it also serves as the end of the second era of Indonesian counter extremism.  
 
Era 3: The BNPT and Reintegration  
 Established by a 2010 addendum to the 2003 Anti-Terrorism Law, the BNPT reports to 
the president and coordinates all the state’s counterterrorism units including Densus 88, the 
National Intelligence Agency, the Anti-Terrorism Desk, and the military (Counter Extremism 
Project, 2019). Beyond this integrational agenda, BNPT also implemented reintegration style 
programming in Indonesia that reflected an official endorsement of crucial anti-extremism 
strategies. As the government agency in charge of post-extremism programming, BNPT’s 
allocation of any resources towards the initiative illustrates a major landmark in Indonesian 
counterterrorism history.  
BNPT’s more specific roles involve formulating policies, strategies, and programs, 
analyzing and evaluating counterterrorism, preventing/fighting radical propaganda, and 
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coordinating implementation of deradicalization. Part of the BNPT’s deradicalization approach 
involved developing trust between detainees and officers through incentives like skill training, 
financial support, and more contact with the prisoner’s family. In one case, the police even paid a 
detainee’s wife’s hospital bills when she gave birth (Istiqomah, 2011). Furthermore, BNPT 
utilized former terrorists to play a major role in their attempts to convince extremists to leave 
radicalism.13 However, the initial programming overseen by BNPT was hindered by a lack of 
coordination between agencies, poor training and support for prison guards, and an allocated 
reintegration budget (Istiqomah, 2011). Now, adequate funding must be pulled from other 
budgets and departments as BNPT continues to face these obstacles to consistent enforcement 
and effective resourcing. Problems within the execution of initiatives also arose as the BNPT and 
police coordinated strongly to reach detainees during the pre-trial process, yet once extremists 
reach prison the effort is less coordinated and less supported centrally per detention center. 
Despite these challenges, a 2017 BNPT report claims that at least 1,000 ex-terrorists were 
successfully “deradicalized” over the previous 3 years (Rohmah, 2017).  
Indonesia backed up its efforts of internal support to extremists facing reintegration by 
increasing its participation in regional and international counterterrorism as well. In 2012, 
Indonesia ratified the ASEAN Convention on Counterterrorism which mandated cooperation on 
terrorism prevention, law enforcement, information sharing, and terrorist rehabilitation (Counter 
Extremism Project, 2019). Internationally, Indonesia co-sponsored U.N. Security Resolution 
2178, a resolution to prevent radicalization and restrict movement of FTFs. At Barack Obama’s 
Summit on Countering ISIL and Violent Extremism in September 2015, vice president Jusul 
 
13 While BNPT sourced former terrorists and extremists to persuade others in the program out of their radical 
ideology, religious reeducation was not as much a key component of the process as in similar Malaysian efforts. 
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Kalla stressed improvement of social welfare and rehabilitation as a crucial strategy in fighting 
extremism. (Counter Extremism Project, 2019). Despite the state’s aim to deradicalize and 
rehabilitate identified extremists and those incarcerated for terrorist activity around the country, 
initiatives only tactically employed medium level reintegration. Indonesia in this era was 
growing its counterterrorism agenda to include reintegration strategies a part of post-extremism 
programming.  
Furthermore, the change in policy approach illustrated by forming the BNPT and the new 
era of counterterrorism was met with even greater challenges. While most major attacks between 
2000 and 2010 appeared to be conducted by the Al-Qaeda aligned JI, the group splintered and 
expanded in 2014 when its former leader, Abu Bakar Bashir, gave allegiance to ISIS (Counter 
Extremism Project, 2019). Similarly, in Southeast Asia broadly, ISIS’s rise divided and 
energized the transnational jihad movements throughout the region (Sumpter, 2019).  
 
Era 4: Modern Reintegration: Laws, Policy, and Media 
 The fourth and final era in Indonesian extremism and counter-extremism begins around 
2016 with the government’s use of online platforms to combat radicalization and continues to 
December 2019. Consistent with previous eras, the period is marked by changing radical activity. 
ISIS and pro-ISIS extremists continue to terrorize Indonesia. For example, ISIS-linked violent 
activity included attacking a shopping district in 2016, killing a two-year-old child outside a 
church in Borneo, suicide bombing a bus station in May 2017, a prison riot in 2018 involving 
156 inmates, and numerous other attacks and thwarted bombings (Schulze, 2018). A new 
dimension, however, includes the involvement of women, children, and whole families in 
attacks. On 13 May 2018, a family of six bombed three churches in Surabaya, East Java, killing 
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twelve people. This attack marks the first attack by a female suicide bomber in Indonesian 
history (Schulze, 2018). The next day, a family of five riding two motorcycles bombed a police 
station in Surabaya, East Java with only the eight-year-old daughter surviving (Schulze, 2018).  
These events mark an unfortunate and important turn in Indonesian extremism, creating a 
new obstacle for the BNPT, and society as a whole. With more women and even whole families 
participating in jihadi movements, the potential population of violent extremists who engage in 
terrorist activity expanded to groups that may be harder to identify. The immense challenge for 
states to see into and understand families as terrorist units is compounded by extremists' use of 
social media in spreading their propaganda, especially to Muslim youth (Suarda, 2016). As 
access to direct messaging applications such as Telegram, Facebook, and WhatsApp is extremely 
prevalent across Indonesia, authorities face a variety of complications to keep track of all flagged 
individuals and their associates over the internet. Additionally, identifying and monitoring those 
individuals planning attacks or deemed radical is ethically dubious though it may help determine 
how and when messages on social media platforms pose a significant threat to domestic security. 
Despite the complications, since 2016 Indonesia continues to attempt to silence radical activity 
on social media. For example, the government blocked websites with extremist material and sent 
messages to social media platforms requesting the removal of jihadi propaganda. The state also 
blocked Telegram, an encrypted messaging service frequently used by radicals to plan attacks, 
completely (Counter Extremism Project, 2019).  
The measures taken by Indonesia to combat the changing environment of terrorism are 
controversial and raise questions of whether the country is overstepping rights in pursuit of 
security. Banning messages that are arbitrarily declared radical risks suppressing freedom of 
speech. Additionally, these decisions can even backfire and give jihadists oppressive narratives 
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about the government to use in recruitment. With the threat of terrorists utilizing new technology 
and more insidious methods of threatening public security, emphasizing strictly punitive 
counterterrorism measures is an ineffective approach.  
High recidivism rates remain a problem for Indonesia in recent years. According to 
research conducted by the Brookings Institute, the recidivism rate in Indonesia is at least 15% 
(Ismail & Sim, 2016). To its credit, authorities, primarily the BNPT, are attempting to bolster 
programming, for example, by supporting families of incarcerated jihadists. On the other hand, 
over the last several years, many harsh laws concerning the detention of terrorists and free 
speech have also been proposed (Rucktäschel & Schuck, 2019, Counter Extremism Project 2019; 
USINDO 2011). The laws passed by Indonesia may add more challenges to a currently 
challenged reintegration program. Calls for a stronger risk assessment technique of high-risk 
detainees and better coordination between the BNPT and other agencies are proposed solutions 
to Indonesia’s recidivism problem (Counter Extremism Project 2019; Suarda, 2016; Sumpter 
2019).  
Indonesia also developed other methods of tackling extremism in recent years that are 
more sustainable and holistic and consistent with medium-high levels of reintegration. In 2018, 
President Widodo supported a new policy to prevent the radicalization of children (Suzuki, 
2018). The BNPT partnered with the Wahid Foundation to implement reintegration programs 
and developed relationships with several NGOs to facilitate the return of former extremists to 
their communities (Rucktäschel & Schuck, 2019; Sumpter 2018). Relationships between 
government and community organizations are crucial in Indonesia’s reintegration efforts. The 
state can empower community-based groups to generate more resources, procedures, and 
possibilities for sustained long term support for individuals undergoing reintegration. For 
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example, with reintegrated individuals spread throughout Indonesia, it is easier for local 
organizations to maintain contact with and support former extremists in their community. NGO 
and civil organization involvement will be explored further in Chapter 4. Other progressive steps 
by Indonesian authorities encompass countering extremist propaganda with messages of peaceful 
perspectives of Islam and the development of economic support for former extremists.  
Overall, Indonesia’s modern-day counterterrorism adaptations to changing extremism are 
marked by both hard and soft approaches of incarceration paired with reintegrative 
programming, community cooperation, and an emphasis on combating radical ideology. Thus, 
Indonesia has presented a positive growth model towards achieving reintegration and offering 
the most promise for sustained success (see Fig. 3.1).  
 
Fig 3.1: Visualization of Indonesia’s evolution concerning reintegration 
 
3.2 Malaysia  
Era 1: Reintegration during The Emergency 
 The first era of Malaysian counterterrorism began with the Malayan emergency which 
occurred from 1948 to 1960. This conflict resulted from attempts of the Communist Party of 
Malaya (CPM) to overthrow British colonial rule. The British defeated the communist insurgents 
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and negotiated Malaysia’s independence in 1957 (Counter Extremism Project, 2019). Despite 
serving as more of a nuisance than a serious threat with occasional violent raids, the CPM leader 
Chin Peng continued to fight, not for independence, but for the spread of communism within 
Malaysia (Bakar, 2019). Thus, as an independent state, Malaysia was born combating extremism, 
as depleted CPM forces continued to present resistance to the State until a peace agreement was 
reached between CPM and the Malaysian government in 1989.  
During the decades after independence, Malaysia took several steps to fight such 
extremism. The Internal Security Act (ISA), which would serve as a weapon against political 
dissent for years to come, denied CPM the opportunity to spread their propaganda. Malaysia 
strengthened its military and developed ASEAN alliances to further bolstering military strength 
(Nathan, 1990). After the peace accords, CPM members sought battle in politics as some 
members were reintegrated under the peace accords, such as Chin Peng himself. Although 
allowing CPM members a place in Malaysia and nonviolent avenues for self-advocacy, this early 
reintegration created frustration as many ethnic minorities in Malaysian still struggled to gain 
citizenship (Nathan, 1990). Malaysia’s brushes with terrorism did not end there, however, as 
several extremist groups also began operating in Malaysia before the late 1990s (Counter 
Extremism Project, 2019). Among the groups were Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia (KMM), JI, 
the Philippines’ Moro Islamic Liberation Front, and Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG).  
 In contrast to Indonesia, reintegration played a role from the outset of statehood, and even 
before in the early years of the Malayan Emergency. British forces implemented programs of 
rehabilitation fitted to the context of this era. These programs aimed to control and engage the 
population of captured communists to divulge information and turn on their comrades. The state 
offered captured combatants rewards, negating the economic incentives that recruited them to the 
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communist cause in the first place. Some detainees were recruited into British platoons and even 
hours after capture fought against their previous comrades, perhaps because this approach broke 
the social and personal bonds extremists held to the communist party, they no longer felt any ties 
to the group (Khor, 2013).  
The Surrender for Rewards Program provided detainees with money to start a life away 
from communism, which provided a strong counterterrorist measure as did the Taiping 
Rehabilitation Camp which was founded for the rehabilitation of non-insurgents in 1949. This 
camp in particular was meant to offset harsher treatment of the Chinese in Malayan, an important 
effort to address the social aspects of reintegration (Khor, 2013). The overwhelming success of 
this initial deradicalization strategy eventually broke morale and reduced the numbers of the 
communist combatants around 1990 (Khor, 2013). These concepts developed an early 
foundation for the continuous implementation of reintegration style programming as a crucial 
tenant of Malaysian counterterrorism as holistic and long-term approaches to security threats 
would remain constant (Khor, 2013). Thus, during its fight for independence and in its infancy as 
a state, Malaysia demonstrated a medium-high level of commitment to reintegration. 
Finally, while the period of colonization and fighting for independence is outside the 
scope of this thesis for Indonesia, there is an interesting variance between the two states as the 
development of initial counterterrorism strategies were both heavily influenced by colonization. 
The Dutch did not implement reintegration to the degree executed by the British. Where the 
British recognized the political roots of the Emergency and were able to combine military efforts 
with efforts to improve the socioeconomic status of the Malayan Chinese, the Dutch responded 
to extremism with military might and suppression of nationalist movements. The Indonesian 
fight for independence was marked by guerilla warfare and excessive violence by Dutch forces 
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in responses often involving unprosecuted war crimes (Luttikhuis & Moses, 2012). This theme 
of aggression and violence does appear to parallel Suharto’s rule in Indonesia, which was 
similarly marked by force rather than holistic approaches like reintegration.  
Looking at both Indonesia and Malaysia, it appears that colonization and the battle for 
independence had lasting effects on counterterrorism approaches. Great Britain maintained a 
liberal type of colonial rule, keeping a good record of rule of law civil liberties, political 
participation, economic opportunity, and willingness to encourage independence. Furthermore, 
the British’s use of a deradicalization strategy to combat the communists during the Malayan 
Emergency exhibited the value of a varied and reintegrationist counter to violent extremism. 
Subsequently, a similar approach would be adopted into the Malaysian counterterrorism agenda 
even as soon as CPM leaders surrendered. Yet, Indonesia experienced an opposite approach as 
the Dutch enforced a repressive type of colonial government and preferred military force in the 
battle to maintain control of the islands. These tactics continued into Suharto’s rule where 
extremist factions were put down by force with no plan for their reintegration. Thus, the early 
role of reintegration in Malaysia but not Indonesian history may have played a significant part in 
both countries’ early counterterrorism strategies.  
 
Era 2: 9/11 & the Internal Security Act 
The second era of Malaysian terrorism begins in January 2000 when Al Qaeda operatives 
met in Kuala Lumpur for training. The eventual perpetrators of the September 11th attacks on the 
World Trade Center attended this training (Sumpter, 2019). The next year, KMM extremists, 
many of whom had trained in Afghanistan, set fire to a church and Christian Community Center 
in Sungai Petani, Malaysia. Christians were the target of KMM activities as the group sought to 
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develop Malaysia into an Islamic state (Counter Extremism Project, 2019). After the 9/11 attacks 
on New York, Malaysia cracked down on the extremist groups KMM and JI. In 2003, the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs founded the Southeast Asia Regional Center for Counterterrorism 
(SEARCC) to bolster domestic security and relationships with its allies, (Samuel, 2016). The 
SEARCC involves countries outside of Southeast Asia, including Australia, Canada, Japan, 
Korea, the U.K., and the U.S. and was designed to enhance counterterrorism enforcement 
through collaboration with think tanks and international organizations like the U.N. In 2007, 
Malaysian authorities arrested 19 KMM and 68 JI leaders under rule of the ISA, a controversial 
1957 law permitting arrest and detention of individuals without trial or criminal charges. The 
arrests caused serious damage to both the networks of KMM and JI in Malaysia.  
Malaysia also took to other approaches in the battle against new extremist threats. In 
2001, Malaysia passed the Anti-Money Laundering and Anti-Terrorism Financing Act of 2001 
(AMLATFA) to investigate illegal funding of extremism (Counter Extremism Project, 2019). 
This act requires institutions to report any suspicious transactions to a financial intelligence unit 
that can investigate and if necessary, prosecute those funding extremist activities and the 
extremists themselves (Hamidi, 2016). Capturing financiers also increases the number of 
individuals that can be reintegrated, further thwarting more covert members of extremist 
networks. Overall, the passage of this act serves as another example of Malaysia’s commitment 
to more diverse counterterrorism strategies.  
In 2005, the Royal Malaysian Police launched a program aimed at correcting 
misinterpretations of Islamic discourse and ideology in efforts to deradicalize extremists. Such 
efforts came from observations that punitive approaches such as imprisonment without trial 
under the ISA, police abuse, or inhumane treatment were promoting radicalization and revenge, 
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an unintentional consequence of their counterterrorism approach (Guay, 2018). Ahmad El-
Muhammady, a rehabilitation officer for the Malaysian government, describes that the program 
involves relationships with constant communication between detainees and officers as he tries to 
rewrite their mental narratives. Despite these efforts, more financial support was needed for the 
program to allow former extremists their economic independence from extremist networks 
(Guay, 2018). While in the spirit of reintegration, this early programming still placed greater 
emphasis on the ideology of an extremist, perhaps limiting its effectiveness. Nevertheless, 
Malaysia claimed a 95% success rate of its program for extremists arrested between 2001 and 
2011 (Ismail, 2016). Some discussion around the validity of this statistic is present in the field, 
but Malaysia continued its progress towards the effective use of reintegration programming 
through the early 2000s. From the 9/11 attacks to repeal of the ISA, Malaysia demonstrated a 
low to a medium level commitment to reintegration as the state focused more on establishing 
collaborative networks and laws to criminalize existing extremist financing activity. 
 
Era 3: Modern Reintegration: Laws, Policy, and Media 
The repeal of the Internal Security Act in 2012 delineates what I consider the end of the 
second and beginning of the third era in Malaysia. This period involves passing new counter-
extremism legislation and expanding roles in both regional and international efforts to combat 
ISIS. Regarding cooperation, in October 2015, Malaysia was selected by the United States as a 
regional center to counter online propaganda by ISIS and in the same year joined a United States 
Global coalition against ISIS (Counter Extremism Project, 2019). In 2016, Malaysia adopted a 
handful of UN resolutions, key among them a resolution to combat the threat of returning FTFs. 
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Then, in 2017, the country negotiated plans with Indonesia and the Philippines to run joint naval 
patrols (Counter Extremism Project 2019; Sumpter, 2019).  
Internally, the 2015 passing of the Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA) allowed 
authorities to detain those suspected of being terrorists for up to two years and restrict their 
internet access among other things. Malaysia also launched the National Security Council Act 
and started the National Special Operations Force to strengthen response and prevention of 
terrorism (Counter Extremism Project, 2019). The National Security Council established by the 
act held authority to designate an area as a “national security area”, which was subjected to 
martial law, permitting search and arrest of persons and searching of homes without a warrant. 
These policies presenting a largely similar style of general oppression under a claim of national 
security to that under the ISA. Meanwhile, the National Special Operations Force is Malaysia’s 
first multi-agency counter-extremism force, made up of officers from the Malaysian Armed 
Forces, Royal Malaysian Police, and the Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency (Counter 
Extremism Project, 2019). 
While these hardened measures were implemented, the Malaysian Minister of Home 
Affairs Ahmad Zahid Hamidi emphasized his country’s commitment to reintegration to the UN 
in 2016 (Hamidi, 2016). Hamidi also hosted a special ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on the Rise 
of Radicalization and Violent Extremism to share ideas and policies regarding reintegration 
(Sumpter, 2019). A new initiative was added just last year to Malaysia’s reintegration 
programming when authorities made an offer for 102 Malaysians to return from joining ISIS. 
Pending certain qualifications, such as security checks, investigations, psychological exams, and 
counseling to determine an individual's level of radicalization. The extremists could be 
reintegrated following a month-long program with the potential for no prison time if they did not 
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participate in militant or criminal activities. Malaysians who were involved must face trial, 
which was a major development in human rights from the inconsistent trials and lack of 
proceedings under the ISA. Importantly, women and children are handled on a case-by-case 
basis, suggesting that adaptations to programming for newer terror threats are underdeveloped 
(Counter Extremism Project 2019; Sumpter, 2019).  
Malaysia, like Indonesia, also adapted a counterterrorism program toward the 
digitalization of terrorism. A prime example is the establishment of the Counter Messaging 
Center, which uses social media to monitor extremist propaganda (Hamidi, 2016). Additionally, 
the Department of Islamic Development of Malaysia constantly monitors social media to detect 
terrorist activity or what the government considers false information about Islam. Subsequently, 
the department then has authority to stop that spread of information (Hamidi, 2016). Malaysian 
law reflects these efforts, as it punishes any “promotion, solicitation, or propagation of 
extremism using any media constituents” (Hamidi, 2016). Similar to the scenario in Indonesia, 
shutting down social media or punishing a user more severely highlights a discussion around 
state-imposed censorship. Despite Malaysia’s increase in policies to strengthen suppression of 
extremism, the country’s commitment both regionally and internationally to reintegration and 
inclusion of various psychological and economic factors ranks as medium-high as there are a 
variety of inconsistencies with its more hardline approaches. Thus, Malaysia presents a 
comparatively strong but stagnant relationship to reintegration over time compared to Indonesia, 
suggesting that there must be intentional initiatives taken from now on by the state to move the 
program along (see Fig. 3.2). 
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Fig 3.2: Visualization of Malaysia’s evolution concerning reintegration 
 
Conclusion 
Beginning fundamentally with their respective fights for independence against Dutch and 
British colonial forces, Indonesia and Malaysia navigated distinctive paths toward their current 
counter-extremism agendas. Malaysia was born with a sense of the power that reintegration held 
to win against extremism. However, Indonesia’s violent struggle with the Dutch colonial forces 
led to a more authoritarian approach to counterinsurgencies marked by generalized suppression 
of extremism. Despite their different foundations, both countries eventually ended up as leaders 
of the reintegration movement at regional and international levels. The states equipped 
themselves with increasingly robust laws and policies paralleling the global efforts to counter 
violent extremism following 9/11. As Muslim majority countries facing unique threats of 
transnational terrorism, Indonesia and Malaysia have been forced to work through a variety of 
approaches faster than other nations. Differences do exist, however. For example, Indonesia 
expanded its programming beyond ideological change and Malaysia continues to emphasize 
changing perceptions of Islam and the funding of terrorist activities. Finally, despite increasing 
their legislation to grant more police and military authority plus set tighter control on social 
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media, both countries maintain strong deradicalization programs which ultimately limits the 
efficacy of their programming.  
Overall, Indonesia and Malaysia interacted with various factors that facilitate successful 
reintegration over their experience with constructing counterterrorism methodology. Still, 
commitment to a deradicalization-based approach, impacts of early colonialism, and regional 
commitments limit their programs’ potential to affect change on an individual and collective 
scale. Both states possess important reintegration tactics in their approaches to deradicalize 
extremists that resulted from histories of colonialism, terrorism, and governmental change. Thus, 
Indonesia’s and Malaysia’s evolution to their current reintegration programming underscores that 
the two states are still strengthening much of their approach and may require more deliberate 
reform to best utilize the factors that facilitate reintegration.    
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Chapter 4: An Evaluation of Reintegration in Indonesia and Malaysia 
 
We spend all this time working with them, but if they go back to where they came from, 
radicalism can enter their hearts very quickly, (…) It makes me worried 
 
Senior Social Worker Sri Musfiah, 201914 
Introduction  
 Indonesia and Malaysia continue to demonstrate their commitment to reintegration as a 
counterterrorism strategy over time. However, whether their efforts are effective and relevant 
today must be assessed to evaluate how these approaches can be utilized beyond the two states. 
Though these questions are difficult to answer, demonstrating efficacy, or lack thereof, will 
directly impact national security and international counter-extremism approaches. As previously 
described, recidivism rates are currently the standard of assessment. Nevertheless, recidivism 
rates are not always available and often fall short of capturing the whole picture of successful 
reintegration. Thus, to better comprehend the success of a program, there needs to be an 
assessment of whether key factors facilitating reintegration are being addressed, reintegrated 
individuals play an active role in society, and countries are adapting programs to changing 
radicalization landscapes. This chapter will define evaluation criteria based on the factors that 
facilitate reintegration identified in chapter 2 and subsequently use those criteria to assess the 
reintegration programming in Malaysia and Indonesia.  
 To start, I will describe the factors that facilitate an extremist’s reintegration into society. 
Next, using these factors I will develop specific criteria for the evaluation of all state-level 
 
14 As a senior social worker, Sri Musfiah engages with radicalized children in Indonesia to deradicalize and 
reintegrate them (Beech and Suhartono, 2019). 
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reintegration programming in Indonesia and Malaysia emphasizing programs that do or do not 
address the current threats of extremism. The evaluation criteria will then be applied to modern 
Malaysian and Indonesian reintegration programs with a subsequent discussion of similarities 
and differences between the two states’ approaches. With consideration of current measures of 
success, recommendations, and directions for future improvements will be discussed.  
4.1 Factors that Fuel Reintegration 
The return of an extremist individual to society is a personal journey and likewise should 
be met with a personalized approach. Furthermore, several common factors that are essential to 
the success of reintegration, discussed in chapter 2, will be revisited here. The factors that will be 
discussed in this chapter include 1. engagement with nongovernmental actors, 2. continuity and 
follow up of programming, 3. economic stability, 4. inclusion of age and gender support, 5. 
psychological care, 6. educational opportunity, and 7. social inclusion. All seven of these factors 
were specifically chosen as they fit into the context of Indonesian and Malaysian society as well 
as the larger path towards successful reintegration. Each factor will be explored in more detail to 
illustrate their relevance as a measure of successful reintegration. The 7 components will then be 
scored on a 0-2-point scale and evaluated in reference to each state’s programming later in the 
chapter.  
The first factor that facilitates reintegration is governmental collaboration with NGOs 
and civil society organizations. The capability of these nongovernmental actors to provide 
resources to former extremists outside of constraints on the state while fighting stigmatization 
and facilitating meaningful social engagement cannot be understated. Specifically, these 
organizations can help mediate between the state and those individuals who do not view the 
government positively. One example in Indonesia is the Wahid Foundation, an organization that 
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promotes peace and tolerance through initiatives like interfaith dialogues, education for youth, 
and working to improve the welfare of the poor (Wahid, 2019). A government program’s 
willingness to cooperate with valuable civil society organizations and NGOs is important, even 
though establishing boundaries may be complicated. The amount of confidential information 
security agencies share with NGOs and how independently organizations operate outside of 
government interference are important concerns.  
Moreover, NGOs and similar groups are often intertwined with the communities that 
extremists return to. The organizations hold the resources and outreach network to make full 
reintegration more possible. Overall, including NGOs and civil society organizations in 
reintegration programming facilitates many of the other factors that contribute to successful 
reintegration and thus is one of the primary factors.  
The second component is the continuity and follow up beyond initial programming or the 
release of an extremist on the path of reintegration from state care. In addition to examining the 
content of the various programs, we also want to consider the degree to which continuity and 
follow-up to the programming exists. This component is a measure of consistency in 
programming, intel, and the enforcement of important facets of psychological, social, and 
economic factors of reintegration more broadly. The longevity of the reintegration programs will 
illustrate how well mentorship, positive relationships, and financial support are provided to 
individuals during the full path of reintegration across conditions. In many cases, it is not enough 
to release a former extremist into society and leave them be. Instead, stable long-term 
relationships, access to resources, and support is necessary (Hwang, 2018; Sumpter, 2019). This 
continued care can help reintegrating extremists overcome obstacles as they appear and 
extinguish any factors that may push an individual to re-radicalize after participation with the 
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initial programming. For example, if a former extremist is approached by old comrades or is 
facing economic difficulties from a failed business venture, the state or its partners can provide 
support under these situations. If the worst happens and the person re-radicalizes, the state would 
know sooner and could work to prevent the individual from causing harm as well.  
The third factor is the establishment of economic stability for extremists undergoing 
reintegration. If a radicalized individual faces poverty, unemployment, or a depleted sense of 
productivity upon release from jail or state mentorship, they are likely to turn back to extremist 
networks that supported them in those areas. Therefore, reintegration programs must support 
financial stability and achievement of gainful employment to counter the economic draw of 
radicalization and allow former extremists to find purpose while contributing peacefully to 
society at the same time. 
The fourth factor is the inclusion of specialized programming for various ages and 
genders. This factor is growing in its prevalence to global post-extremism programming yet fits 
directly into the context of the current landscape of extremism in Indonesia and Malaysia. The 
increasing participation of women and children in terrorist attacks in Malaysia and Indonesia, as 
discussed in Chapter 3, creates a need for governments to consider these populations in their 
reintegration programs. Individuals of different gender identities may face different challenges 
and have different experiences within extremist networks than men (Nemr et al, 2018). 
Additionally, how individuals are harmed, recruited, and utilized by extremism will determine 
their needs as they exit extremism.  
Likewise, age is another important identity that requires specific inclusion into 
reintegration efforts. Children are indoctrinated by extremists and hold active roles in violent 
extremism just as adults do, however, their recognition and reconciliation with their engagement 
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in terrorist activity will be different than that of an adult with full executive cognitive function 
(Beech & Suhartono, 2019). In brief, these two identities represent some of the individual 
considerations that need to be integrated directly into reintegration programming for it to 
effectively treat the current populations of extremists in both Indonesia and Malaysia.  
The fifth factor I will discuss is psychological care. This factor encompasses several 
areas including an individual’s personality, mental health, formation of a new identity and sense 
of self, and their perceived position in society. Addressing the psychological needs of extremists 
to ensure their security in their identity and beliefs as well as how they identify as a part of civil 
society influences how much a person peacefully reintegrates. One specific component of this 
broad factor is the counseling/therapy granted to both extremists and their families to promote 
mental health and acceptance of a new stable identity. 
The sixth factor I will discuss is educational opportunity. This component refers to the 
extent to which reintegration programming provides individuals with the ability to learn and 
advance by earning educational degrees, receiving job training, religious education, digital 
literacy, or other categories of courses. Pursuing an education initiates several positive effects on 
reintegration, giving former extremists a broader knowledge base from which to consider and 
support pluralist views that combat radicalization. Individuals with educational opportunities can 
also maintain greater potential for a dignified career and sustained financial security. Education 
may also open the door to new social relationships and self-fulfillment, connecting with several 
factors mentioned previously. An educational plan is particularly important where there are 
schools that teach ideals with paths to radicalization or schools that are affiliated with radical 
networks, as in Indonesia and Malaysia. Thus, access to pluralistic or non-religious education 
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should be made available to individuals attempting to reintegrate. Furthermore, measuring the 
availability of these opportunities helps in the assessment of reintegration (Vaughn et al, 2005).  
Finally, the last factor that will be considered is the level of social inclusion. Social 
factors include creating a new social network, support mechanism, identity within the 
community, and redefining one’s social responsibilities. In short, an individual is more likely to 
be successful on their path to reintegration if they can build new and positive relationships to 
take the place of old relationships from extremist networks. An individual’s ability to feel their 
identities reflected in and accepted by their community is constructed by reintegration programs 
that include community dialogues, training of key actors, and opportunities for extremists to 
socialize openly and safely with people of different viewpoints (Hwang, 2018). This criterion is 
closely connected to psychological and economic aspects as well.  
In brief, each of these criteria is relevant to the progression of an extremist towards 
successful and complete reintegration. Additionally, they each represent a component to measure 
the degree to which a program addresses and engages the factors that facilitate reintegration. The 
table below summarizes the criterion and illustrates how each component will be measured and 
analyzed in reference to Indonesia's and Malaysia’s programming on a 0-2 scale. By this scale, 0 
represents little to no inclusion in the process, a 1 is assigned if a factor or method is utilized but 
in a limited way, and a 2 if successful utilization of the factor is achieved to a high degree. The 
ratings given to programs are based on qualitative judgments supported by relevant literature and 
evidence. With seven areas of assessment and a 0-2 scale applied to each, the best possible rating 
is a 14, and the lowest a 0. 
 
 
  
 
74 
 
Table 2: Criterion for Evaluation of Programming in Indonesia and Malaysia 
  Scale 
Factor for 
evaluation 
Definition 0 1 2 
 
Engagement 
with Non-
Government 
Actors 
Cooperation between 
government and NGOs 
or civil society 
organizations 
No involvement 
of NGOs or other 
organizations in 
State 
programming 
Involvement of 
few organizations 
to a limited extent 
or with poor 
coordination 
Strong involvement of 
multiple organizations 
in State programming 
with consistent 
coordination 
 
 
Continuity and 
Follow up 
 
Quality of longitudinal 
tracking and support 
after release from 
prison or state program 
care 
 
No support or 
contact after 
release from 
prison or state 
program care 
 
Follow up is 
attempted but 
inconsistent and 
limited  
 
Follow up includes 
consistent outreach 
and tracking of 
reintegrated 
individuals 
 
 
Economic 
Stability 
 
Support to find and 
secure a job/career plus 
establish financial 
independence 
 
No economic 
support with no 
job training or 
guidance 
The limited 
distribution of 
only: a one-time 
stipend, training, 
or other support  
Robust long-term 
financial and career-
building support and 
resources to develop 
financial independence 
 
 
Inclusion of Age 
and Gender  
Support 
Extent of specialized 
programming and 
resources available to 
address concerns of 
those with different 
ages and gender 
identities 
 
No age or 
gender-specific 
programming 
provided 
Few but limited 
resources or 
opportunities for 
individuals of 
different ages or 
gender identities  
 
Multiple and 
consistent resources or 
opportunities for 
individuals of different 
ages and gender 
identities 
 
 
 
Psychological 
Care 
Counseling/therapy 
provided to both 
extremist and their 
family to facilitate the 
development of a new 
identity 
 
No concern given 
to mental health 
or beliefs of 
extremists or 
their family 
One or few 
resources 
available to 
provide 
counseling or 
therapy to 
extremists or their 
families  
Continuous care and 
multiple resources 
available for 
extremists and families 
to address their mental 
health and beliefs  
 
 
Educational  
Opportunity 
Extent of access to 
quality education or 
vocational training for 
individuals undergoing 
reintegration 
 
No programs or 
classes available 
to individuals 
reintegrating  
Few opportunities 
for education or 
only courses that 
teach religious 
reeducation  
Multiple educational 
opportunities that 
teach to occupational 
skills, formal 
knowledge, and 
higher-level degrees 
 
 
Social Inclusion 
Extent of community 
outreach to help former 
extremists return to a 
society that accepts 
them 
No effort made to 
prepare 
community or 
extremist for 
return 
Limited inclusion 
of community 
actors or 
thoughtful 
preparation of the 
community 
Extensive and diverse 
efforts to prepare both 
the community and 
former extremist for 
return 
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4.2 Evaluation of Indonesia and Malaysia 
The following evaluations concern the last era of Indonesian and Malaysian post-
extremist programs that are currently employed to achieve reintegration. The assignment of 
either a 0, 1, or 2 will be made based on evidence of the state programming and resources 
available to an extremist undergoing reintegration. This analysis will then contribute to the 
overall scoring of the state. I will provide a concluding analysis based on the total scores and 
discuss what those scores indicate for the programs. Frequent achievement of a two and a higher 
total score indicates that state programming is detailed and diverse in the factors used to facilitate 
reintegration. Additionally, it indicates that the state has systems in place for their programs to 
remain sustainable and relevant over time. Nevertheless, even with a high total score, 
programming may still require more depth and consistency, as these measures also need to be 
considered in their impact across time. Contrastingly, frequent scoring of a one or a more mid-
range total score illustrates that the programming is diverse and that there are attempts to address 
many of the factors that facilitate reintegration. However, some factors are overlooked, and the 
programs fall short in terms of consistency, longevity, and coordination of these factors across 
state efforts to reintegrate extremists. Finally, scoring zero or a low total score indicates that 
many factors that facilitate reintegration are not included in state-level programming and there 
are likely a variety of obstacles and abuses in the current programming. With this in mind, I will 
evaluate both states in the same order as they appear in table 2.  
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Engagement with Non-Government Actors 
Firstly, for engagement with non-governmental actors, Indonesia and Malaysia maintain 
a varied but ultimately growing degree of contact with these actors. In Indonesia, the BNPT 
seeks the input of NGOs for reintegration practices. The effort included welcoming an offer from 
an organization called Civil Society Against Violent Extremism (C-SAVE) to assist the Ministry 
of Social Affairs in raising other NGOs and social workers’ awareness of the situation around 
returning extremists and define best practices for their reintegration (Sumpter, 2018). The state 
also permitted Yayasan Prasasti Perdamaian (YPP), a non-governmental organization that runs 
deradicalization programming, to conduct interventions in prisons and provide entrepreneurial 
loans to former extremists (Gunaratna & Sabariah, 2019). However, this cooperation is not 
uniform. While some BNPT departments welcome NGO input, other departments maintain their 
programming especially around religious and citizenship education (Nemr et al, 2018; Sumpter, 
2019). Despite somewhat inconsistent efforts, a memorandum signed by BNPT head Suhardi 
Alius in 2018 declared an aim for further cooperation in counterterrorism and deradicalization 
with non-governmental actors, inspiring hope for increased future progress in this area (Sumpter, 
2018).  
In short, Indonesia is willing to engage with non-governmental actors to the extent that 
these actors can offer similar programming to the state or provide limited consultation in 
developing such programming. Furthermore, the state verbally committed to furthering 
relationships with NGOs and other organizations. Thus, even though there is room for 
improvement in consistency and cooperation, Indonesia’s current reintegration programming and 
commitment to involving non-governmental actors is a 2.  
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Contrastingly, NGO and civil society organization involvement play a more peripheral 
role in Malaysia’s reintegration program. Currently, more engagement with nongovernmental 
actors is being suggested to the state as a way to improve the welcoming of reintegrated 
individuals back into their community (Kamaruddin, 2017; Shahar & Abas 2018). However, the 
actual implementation or utilization of nongovernmental actors in Malaysia’s official 
programming is limited and difficult to trace. Some evidence mentions collaboration between 
Malaysia and NGOs or other organizations as part of a soft approach of counseling and religious 
reeducation, but details beyond that are neglected (Hamidi, 2016; Star Media Group, 2018). 
Following this trend, a 2018 report by the Global Center on Cooperative Security mentions 
Malaysia involved families and NGOs in implementing its reintegration program but fails to 
name or cite any specific organizations (Nemr et al, 2018). 
 Based on these findings, it does not appear that Malaysia made significant efforts to 
work with any specific NGOs or community groups to facilitate reintegration. Yet, the paucity of 
detail and information regarding the relationship or coordination between the state and such 
organizations make it difficult to know the actual extent of NGO and civil organization 
involvement. Without exact evidence of participation with non-governmental actors beyond the 
possible consultatory nature indicated above, Malaysia receives a 0 on involvement and 
engagement of non-governmental actors in reintegration programming.  
 
Continuity and Follow Up 
Similar to the first criterion, continuity and follow-up is an area Indonesia noticeably 
improved in the fourth era but must improve. Part of the obstacles around the successful 
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implementation of this factor is a lack of resources and personnel, which prevents probation 
services from consistently visiting and engaging with released extremists (Sumpter, 2019). This 
limits the ability of the state to monitor whether individuals are returning to extremist beliefs or 
violent behaviors, creating deficiencies in the longevity of the program and detection of possible 
security threats. Security agencies may not even be able to locate ex-extremists, also reflecting a 
lack of communication between different levels of government as well as between the 
government and community accepting a reintegrating individual (Sumpter, 2019). Positively, 
however, Indonesia attempted implementing supportive visits, including a program to purchase 
supplies for former extremists to start their businesses after they left state care (Sumpter, 2019). 
Yet participants reported a lack of follow up and coordination which was in part due to limited 
ability to repeatedly supply resources to individuals across a wide geographical area (Holmer & 
Shtuni, 2017). Ultimately, it appears that the shortcomings of Indonesia’s follow up is not due to 
lack of effort but rather a lack of manpower and resources. Overall, Indonesia receives a 1 in the 
area of follow-up.  
Malaysia, likewise, does not possess adequate resources to actively follow up and lacks 
continuity in the mentorship of their programming (Kamaruddin, 2017; Koehler, 2017). Despite 
limitations, Malaysia does assign case officers to released detainees in efforts to provide 
continuous support and ensure those reintegrating can live sustainably away from extremism 
(Hamidi, 2016). The idea is to foster long-term relationships between rehabilitation officers and 
former detainees so that help is always available if it’s needed (Guay, 2018). Although it appears 
Malaysia has taken steps to maintain continuity, reports citing a lack of continuity and 
engagement with the community depicts limited efficacy (Koehler, 2017; Nemr et al, 2018). For 
these reasons, Malaysia will also earn a 1 for continuity and follow up.  
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Economic Stability 
Similar to how the states struggle to employ a consistent and efficient follow-up protocol 
across the country for reintegrated individuals, it can be challenging to manage economic support 
over time as well. Indonesia provides financial management and vocational training to extremists 
in detention (Counter Extremism Project, 2019; Koehler, 2017). After release, Indonesia issues 
some small entrepreneurial loans to those individuals that complete programming and even 
attempts to provide supplies for reintegrating extremists starting their businesses. However, 
efforts to provide training and distribute loans are somewhat haphazard. For example, one 
recipient reported a lack of material resources, training, and planning, minimizing possible 
benefits of the program (Sumpter, 2018). Furthermore, support from visiting parole officers to 
distribute subsequent monetary support and business resources are reported to be inconsistent or 
unannounced (Sumpter, 2019; Tomsa, 2016). On a community level, some benefits are available 
after release from state care. For example, some NGOs hold economic empowerment workshops 
for female deportees from Syria (Sumpter, 2019). Unfortunately, overall post-release economic 
support appears inconsistent or nonexistent, leading to a lack of ongoing economic stability to 
reintegrating extremists, even if they may have received initial monetary support following 
detention. Thus, the efforts on a state level to ensure the economic stability of reintegrating 
extremists is minimally effective and earns Indonesia a 1 on the scale.  
Malaysia also attempts to employ comparable resources to ensure the economic stability 
of individuals completing state-level reintegration. While in detention, Malaysia provides 
extremists with an agenda of vocational training and education on financial management 
(Hamidi, 2016). Upon release, individuals are provided financial assistance or a monetary 
stipend (Koehler, 2017). During the reintegration process, assistance in finding a job, some 
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training after release, and loans for small businesses also play a role in developing economic 
stability (Kamaruddin, 2017). Despite these efforts, some aspects of programming still fall short. 
Ahmad El-Muhammady, a Malaysian rehabilitation officer, claims that a lack of 
entrepreneurship classes, difficulty finding employers to hire reintegrated Malaysians, and 
blacklisting by banks are serious limitations to the program (Guay, 2018). Thus, while Malaysia, 
like Indonesia, takes steps to provide economic support, programs still must overcome major 
obstacles to supporting those reintegrating. For the reasons outlined above, Malaysia scores a 1 
on economic stability.  
 
Inclusion of Age and Gender Support 
 In recent years, the landscape of terrorist activity has begun to see change in the roles 
played by women and children. With women and even young children participating directly in 
violent attacks in Southeast Asia, states are challenged to consider this population in 
programming. Family terrorist attacks heighten the need for states to address a population of 
survived children, especially girls. In Indonesia a few groups, such as the Wahid Foundation and 
similar nongovernmental organizations, attempt to engage both populations through education 
and community outreach. A strong example with collaboration is between the Indonesian 
government and C-Save to implement treatment and reintegration for women and children 
(International Civil Society Action Network, 2019). Through these efforts, women can receive 
job training, community training, and develop relations with village leaders and employers while 
children are provided with counseling and education. Mothers, who are radicalized and skeptical 
of government intervention, are educated in matters such as the necessity of vaccinations to 
public health (International Civil Society Action Network, 2019).  
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Moreover, programs intended to reintegrate children that receive government funding 
include a madrasa15 run by a former extremist, Khairul Ghazali. Ghazali teaches children about 
peace in Islam while educating them up to a middle school level. Ghazali claims that although 
thousands of children across Indonesia are indoctrinated by extremist parents, only 100 attend 
official reintegration programs (Beech & Suhartono, 2019). One such government-facilitated 
program is held at a Jakarta safe house for children directly involved in terror attacks or who are 
offspring of suicide bombers. The program works with children such as Mila, who at the age of 
nine was launched from between her parents on a motorcycle as they committed a family suicide 
bombing against the Surabaya police station (AFP, 2019). At this safehouse, social workers and 
psychologists try to establish normal daily routines for the effected children while providing 
religious reeducation similar to Ghazali. Given the spectrum of resources supported at a state 
level for women and children, Indonesia earns a 2 on age and gender support. Finally, although 
Indonesia implemented important initial foundations of inclusive programming, there is still 
work to be done to make these resources available and consistent to a larger population of those 
children and women indoctrinated.  
Contrastingly, Malaysia’s inclusion of programming aimed at women and children needs 
greater base level development. In October 2019, Malaysia’s Inspector General of Police stated 
that women and children in Syria must be allowed to return home to Malaysia and attend 
government rehabilitation along with other members of Daesh (Tan, 2018). While this public 
announcement signals state recognition of a place for women and children in reintegration 
 
15 A madrasa is an Islamic educational institution that can provide a constructive resource in societies with limited 
access to education. In Southeast Asia, however, madrasas have been implicated in spreading radical ideology and 
serving as a forum for plotting terrorist activities as well (Ginges, Magouirk, and Atran, 2008). 
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programming, details of any specific programming or initiatives tailored to these two identities 
are lacking.  
Moreover, Malaysia reports that the state maintains one women’s detention center 
specifically for extremists that aims to prevent inmate radicalization (Hamidi, 2016). However, 
there is a paucity of evidence that the reintegration of women is specialized or successfully 
instituted at this facility or more generally. The lack of detailed programming or practice of truly 
tailored resources in Malaysia suggests that perhaps such programming is still being developed 
or is not transparent. Notably, the International Civil Society Action Network recently criticized 
Malaysia’s approach to reintegration as too focused on religious reeducation, which ignores 
other factors that may influence radicalization in women (International Civil Society Action 
Network, 2019). Therefore, the lack of available evidence regarding the already minimal 
reintegration programming specialized for women and children in Malaysia earns the state a 
score of 0 in this category. 
 
Psychological Care 
Psychological care, paramount to the intense ideological and cognitive transformation 
that occurs during reintegration, is a central tenant in both the Indonesian and Malaysian 
approach to reintegration. In Indonesia, counseling is available during incarceration for detainees 
and their families (Gunaratna & Sabariah, 2019). Including their families in psychological care 
can build long term emotional support for the detainee while in prison as well as after release. 
Religious counseling is also utilized as a form of psychological rehabilitation (Gunaratna & 
Sabariah, 2019). Additionally, YPP, C-SAVE, and other organizations affiliated with state 
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programming provide psychological support for prisoners both before and after release (Nemr et 
al, 2018; Sumpter, 2018). Support from these groups includes mental health therapy, mentorship, 
religious counseling, and skill development. While this intervention overlaps with other criteria, 
efforts to connect a former extremist with new social circles or treat mental health concerns are 
intimately tied to a person’s psychological well-being and desire to psychologically change 
habits associated with their extremist life. 
Malaysia’s programming focuses on similar areas of self-reflection, spirituality, 
personality traits, and psychology (Aslam & Bakar, 2020). Psychologists are available to 
prisoners to discuss personal issues in addition to self-esteem classes to help bolster prisoners’ 
confidence and mental health (El-Said, 2012). Detainee’s families are also included to foster 
support and connection outside of the state. Moreover, former extremists play a role in 
counseling detainees as they can speak to the unique circumstances and challenges facing those 
reintegrating (Hamidi, 2016). As discussed previously, Malaysia attempts to create lasting 
relationships between former extremists and their rehabilitation officers in hopes that the officer 
act as a long-term psychological support entity (Guay, 2018). While those relationships are not 
always practiced or sustainable, the effort indicates advancement around the psychological care 
of reintegrating extremists by the state. Therefore, as both Indonesia’s and Malaysia’s programs 
aim to chiefly deradicalize extremists, their programs are relatively robust in addressing the 
psychological state of extremists and their families. The various approaches concerned with the 
psychology of those reintegrating both in detention and after release earn both countries a 2 for 
psychological support.  
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Educational Opportunity 
While in detention, detainees in Indonesia’s programming are given vocational training to 
help them obtain jobs after their release (Istiqomah 2011, Koehler, 2017). This aspect of 
educational opportunity is important for detainees to gain employment upon release as well as to 
feel confident and self-sufficient. Additionally, religious reeducation is an aspect used in both 
Indonesia and Malaysia to help former extremists recognize their religion in a way that promotes 
peace and unity as opposed to violence (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2019). After release, 
Indonesia provides further educational opportunities primarily in partnership with NGOs and 
community organizations. This education may be based on developing job skills, collaborative 
skills, digital literacy, or continued religious reeducation (Nemr et al, 2018). While these 
opportunities are all important to promote sustained reintegration, there appears to be less 
mention of earning higher-level degrees or even standard classroom education in Indonesia’s 
program. Also, as discussed previously in the economic stability section, the job training 
provided may be limited and ineffective. The limitations of this education may do a disservice to 
those reintegrating who are still unprepared and under skilled for the job market (Sumpter, 
2019). For these reasons, Indonesia earns a 1 in terms of educational opportunity as there are 
more standardization and variety that is needed for these opportunities to benefit those entering 
diverse communities from the urban areas that primarily house state-led programming.  
Malaysia utilizes several topics of education in programming around reintegration. 
Detainees participate in educational opportunities for vocational training, social skills, financial 
management, and psychology (Hamidi, 2016). This multi-faceted approach serves to prepare 
detainees for a successful life after release back into their community. In parallel, a strong 
emphasis is still placed on religious reeducation as well as political reeducation. This education 
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institutes teaching of Islam as a moderate religion to attempt to discount the teachings of Daesh, 
an Islamic fundamentalist group (Koehler, 2017). Education at this level is provided by a team of 
religious teachers, former extremists, and community leaders (Hamidi, 2016). Nearing release, 
reintegrating individuals are provided job training and some versions of social education to 
facilitate the rest of their journey (Kamaruddin, 2017). Malaysia provides reintegrating 
extremists with many areas of education while in detention. Therefore, despite possible barriers 
that face those reintegrating in Malaysia from receiving standard or higher-degree education, 
Malaysia earns a 2 in educational opportunity for offering an assortment of teachings that 
increase the likelihood of sustained reintegration.  
 
Social Inclusion 
Indonesia attempts to make social inclusion a key aspect of its reintegration programming 
specifically by focusing on the families of extremists. In detention, the program incorporates the 
detainee’s family into his/her reintegration, beginning the foundations of social support 
(Gunaratna & Sabariah, 2019). The program incorporates former extremist support as well, 
providing individuals with someone relatable to talk to. The most important facet is within NGO 
involvement because they provide social inclusion both by talking with detainees before release 
and working to prepare communities for their arrival after release (Sumpter, 2019). Preparing the 
community is a crucial step for reintegration as it can curb possible alienation and social 
exclusion that may drive reintegrating extremists back to a former, more accepting, extremist 
group.  
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These efforts of outreach and groundwork are designed to create a strong base of support 
for reintegrating individuals; however, challenges do arise. Many former extremists are not 
welcomed by their community and face isolation from other residents. One former extremist 
reported receiving stares from those around him and his children being bullied (Sumpter, 2019). 
Coordination is another limitation, as sometimes communities and even family members are 
unaware that their neighbor or loved one is returning home and attempting to reintegrate. 
Overworked caseworkers, charged with alerting and preparing these groups, are also too 
burdened in some cases to provide consistent meetings (Sumpter, 2019; Tomsa, 2016). These 
limitations as well as no available evidence on efforts to facilitate community dialogues around 
interfaith relations, relationships with police, or ethnic tensions contribute to a score more near a 
1 for Indonesia in the realm of social inclusion.  
 For Malaysia’s program, social inclusion also begins with family support, a major factor 
in their reintegration programs. In some cases, officers contact a detainee’s family before and 
after prison to help facilitate their transfer back to the community (Hamidi, 2016). Another 
important factor that could facilitate social inclusion is the longitudinal relationships with 
rehabilitation officers. As mentioned previously, officers ideally would meet with reintegrated 
individuals on a long-term and consistent basis providing a source of social support and 
integration into the community. Although not as extensive as in Indonesia, Malaysia’s programs 
also reach out to community members to help them prepare for the return of extremists and 
incorporate former extremists into the social fabric of their community (Hamidi, 2016; Aslam & 
Bakar, 2020). This approach is supplemented by teaching social skills and personality training 
during detention. However, the extent of NGO and community involvement does not appear as 
broad as in Indonesia. Finally, though Malaysia provides the skills and support to rejoin society 
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there is minimal work done to engage the actual communities around these reintegration 
extremists before or during their return. Thus, Malaysia earns a 1 in this category.  
 
Table 3: Evaluation of Indonesia and Malaysia’s Programming  
Factor Score 
 Indonesia Malaysia 
Engagement with 
Nongovernment Actors 
2 0 
Continuity and 
Follow up 
1 1 
Economic Stability 1 1 
Inclusion of Age and 
Gender  Support 
2 0 
Psychological  
Care 
2 2 
Educational Opportunity 
 
1 2 
Social Inclusion 
 
1 1 
Total 
 
10 7 
 
Conclusion 
 In brief, based on the above evaluation and results, Indonesia’s programming appears to 
perform better than Malaysia’s in how the state facilitates effective reintegration. The main 
advantage Indonesia possesses is the state's growing collaboration with NGOs and civil society 
organizations to implement and sustain a variety of its programming. These relationships are 
deeply beneficial especially in supporting the social inclusion of reintegrating extremists. 
Indonesia also illustrated its programs’ adaptability by beginning to provide more specialized 
support for women and children than available in Malaysia. Contrastingly, Malaysia sustains 
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advantages in educational opportunity due to the variety of opportunities available to detainees 
including financial management, social skills, vocational training, and psychology.  
Indonesia scored a 1 in 4/7 categories excluding non-governmental actors, inclusion of 
age and gender support, and psychological care for which they earned a 2 to end with an overall 
score of 10. This suggests a multi-faceted program that addresses many needs of those 
reintegrating, albeit with limited development and coordination of many areas across the state’s 
wide geographical area. Malaysia, while scoring a 2 on education and psychological care, earned 
a 0 for engagement with nongovernmental actors, inclusion of gender and age support, and social 
inclusion for a total score of 7. These scores suggest that while Malaysia’s program possesses 
noticeable strengths the state generally has a less diverse approach to reintegration as much of 
the focus lies in religious reeducation. 
Overall, Indonesia’s score of 10/14 rests in the higher score range while Malaysia’s 7/14 
rests more medially, which indicates marked progress in both programs with room for 
improvement and adaptation. These scores should be interpreted with caution as they too have 
limitations, but Indonesia’s higher score does reflect an overarching trend of the country bending 
its approach toward reintegration. As concluded in chapter 3, over the 4 eras Indonesia has 
shown positive growth towards including reintegration into its counterterrorism agenda. Thereby, 
the state’s recent experience with family-based terrorist attacks and available networks of 
community-based groups generated salient concentration on these factors in Indonesia than 
Malaysia. These sensitivities that Indonesia developed within especially the past five years, 
indicates a continued desire to bolster the success of their post-extremism programming with 
reintegration efforts. Therefore, in many ways Indonesia's response to returning extremists 
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improved beyond its colonial roots of military violence to achieve a diverse agenda of tactics and 
possess great future potential. 
Contrastingly, Malaysia’s approach is still deeply rooted in deradicalization and 
controlled ideological change. This difference and the deficits in programming illustrate little 
political will from Malaysia and to some extent Indonesia, in pursuing reintegration fully. 
Changes in ideology are harder to measure long term and challenging to connect to social or 
economic reintegration, making Malaysia’s interpretation of reintegration relatively more 
complicated to visualize. Consequently, Malaysia’s commitment to deradicalization and early 
successes from their efforts has left the government less inclined to diversify programming 
significantly beyond the religious reeducation and psychological care they already provide. In 
this way, Malaysia’s history of using reintegration as an effective approach to address returning 
extremists has not served to produce exponential growth in the state’s recent history. Instead, the 
state must reconsider its goals and as in Indonesia, invest more heavily into resourcing and 
sustaining programs consistent with factors that facilitate effective reintegration.   
 This assessment is meant to evaluate the efficiency of state-led reintegration 
programming by measuring the consistent use and consideration of factors that facilitate 
reintegration. As discussed earlier in the thesis, there is no one complete, robust, and detailed 
measure for effectiveness that is the standard for the field. Instead, recidivism rates are the 
current standard measure to quantify reintegration’s effectiveness, though it is an incomplete 
gauge. Nevertheless, comparing the results of this evaluation to the reported recidivism rates in 
Indonesia and Malaysia provides an important point of comparison between the measures and 
critique of the exploration.  
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Objective and well-supported rates of recidivism are difficult to obtain, although the 
numbers currently available are worth mentioning. The Brookings Institute estimated Indonesia’s 
recidivism rate to be 15% in 2016 (Ismail & Sim, 2016). The same year that report was released, 
Malaysia’s Special Branch director claimed a 95% success rate for his country’s program based 
on recidivism, although the claim faces some challenges (Counter Extremism Project, 2019; 
Ismail, 2016). Using the rates given by the Brookings Institute and Malaysia’s government, it 
would appear that Malaysia’s reintegration programming was more effective in 2016. While this 
may on its face appear to challenge my findings, the rates are of limited utility as they ultimately 
only indicate cases of state-reported re-radicalization, reoffence, or reincarceration. This may 
suggest Malaysia’s self-evaluation is incomplete, underreported, or ineffective as the state may 
not be aware of how many extremists actually re-radicalize or re-offend.  
Additionally, I was not able to find Indonesia’s self-reported figures and some of 
Malaysia’s published success rates measure how many extremists “successfully completed” 
programming rather than recidivism (Jani, 2017). In Indonesia, the Brookings Institute reports 
that “there is no national database tracking arrests, convictions, and releases in a timely manner”, 
so their rate is a “prediction” based on about 47 identified cases (Ismail & Sim, 2016). In both 
cases, the evidence that Indonesia’s and Malaysia’s recidivism rates are updated frequently or 
maintain robust practices of data collection is unavailable. These gaps can indicate that there is a 
disconnect between my findings and 2016 recidivism rates due to change over time and 
ineffective reporting mechanisms. Regardless, my findings support, as others have, that better 
evaluation and assessment of reintegration programming is needed to comprehend recidivism, 
individual transformation, and societal development (Gunaratna & Sabariah, 2019; Koehler, 
2017; Veldhuis 2012). Specifically, recidivism rates exemplify a problematic quantitative 
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measure of reintegration which must be supplemented by qualitative evaluation of existing 
programming as done above. The combination of qualitative and quantitative reporting on state 
reintegration programming must also be completed on a larger scale, regularly, and by various 
groups.    
Finally, by comparing the Indonesian and Malaysian reintegration programs several 
important lessons arise. Both programs incorporate aspects of economic incentives and 
psychological care, as well as few consistent or practiced social support measures. Some of these 
initiatives, like separating extremists’ detainees from other inmates, providing counseling to 
extremists and their families, providing some job training or monetary aid, and preparing 
communities for extremists’ return, represent basic building blocks of state reintegration 
programming. Moreover, shortcomings of both programs in the evaluation were consistently due 
to lack of resourcing to the programs, training of personnel, inconsistencies across individual 
cases and geographical areas, and poor translation between programming and practice. 
Particularly, at a community level the state is deeply disconnected from those on the ground that 
can provide support in ways to alleviate some of these shortcomings as even in Indonesia 
community groups are underused.  
Overall, these deficiencies do not indicate that these programs are inherently 
inconsiderate of the primary factors that facilitate reintegration or should not receive 
international recognition for transforming norms of state responses to returning extremists. 
Instead, Indonesian and Malaysian state reintegration programming is in practice notably 
ineffective and inconsistent, indicating the states must refocus the agenda fully towards 
reintegration to produce change and growth.  
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Chapter 5: Collaboration, Media, and Further Research 
 
We teach them that Islam is a peaceful religion and that jihad is about building not destroying. I 
am a model for the children because I understand where they come from. I know what it is like to 
suffer. Because I was deradicalized, I know it can be done. 
 
Khairul Ghazali, 201916 
 
Introduction 
With this thesis, I established that Indonesia and Malaysia utilize varied and multifaceted 
approaches to integrate extremists back into society that draws on some key factors that facilitate 
reintegration; however, the states fall short of implementing a fully reintegrationist agenda. I 
argued that reintegration represents the best and most holistic approach for states to address 
populations of extremists returning to civil society. Indonesia and Malaysia’s limited efforts to 
address psychological, social, and financial issues facing extremists demonstrate how they are 
making some investments in effective reintegration programming at a state level. In Indonesia, 
the state faced many challenges in developing such infrastructure from the militarized approach 
left by colonization and subsequent authoritarian rule. Additionally, issues of inconsistent 
enforcement and access to services across the archipelago plus deficiencies in resourcing remains 
a major obstacle. In Malaysia, seeds of reintegration style programming were planted early on as 
the British and a young Malayan government successfully reintegrated communist extremists. 
However, over time the state’s approach remained largely stagnant and still relies heavily on 
recidivism measures for success and focuses on religious reeducation as a primary approach. 
 
16 Khairul Ghazali is a former extremist from Indonesia that served five years in prison for his crimes and now runs 
the madrasa mentioned in chapter 4 (Beech and Suhartono, 2019). 
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Additionally, both states face mounting issues around balancing the role of the state and 
protecting human rights as they attempt to address more aspects of individual extremists’ lives 
and minds. Despite these challenges, the evaluation of Indonesia’s and Malaysia’s state-level 
reintegration programming and the factors the facilitate reintegration depicts that reintegration is 
the most effective solution to peacefully integrate former extremists and empower communities.  
In this chapter, I will conclude the comparison between the two cases by providing a 
short analysis of the regional implications of these results and the looming threat of militarization 
to reintegration in Southeast Asia. I will discuss the role of social media in reintegration and the 
dangers of states impinging on personal freedoms to address virtual extremism. These topics fall 
outside of my central question on the use of factors that facilitate reintegration in Indonesian and 
Malaysia state programming, however, they represent important features of the broader 
discussion around reintegration and counterterrorism. 
 
5.1 Regional Impacts  
 As discussed in chapter 4, although Indonesia and Malaysia were considered to have 
successful programs, there is still much room for improvement of their policies. Neither state 
possesses an effective method of monitoring long-term programming success or a complete 
metric of evaluation. Primary steps towards filling these gaps will require a renegotiation of their 
agenda to prioritize reintegration instead of deradicalization. Such a shift is key to alleviating 
several of the obstacles mentioned in chapter 4 that prevented both programs from performing 
better. For example, prioritizing reintegration requires the state to allocate more funding and 
resources to long term check-ins, to support the economic stability of reintegrated individuals, 
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and to expand the diversity of identities served by their programming. Similarly, further regional 
collaboration between states could help these programs to reach higher degrees of success as 
international relationships can produce transnational resources and information sharing on how 
to achieve fuller reintegration. The importance of considering the region around Indonesia and 
Malaysia is also critical given the fluidity of terrorist networks and activity across Southeast 
Asia. Thus, there must be further detailed study of the regional implications surrounding the 
implementation of state-level reintegration programming in Southeast Asia broadly. Importantly, 
many of these implications relate to the results of this thesis by representing direct paths of 
improvement and adaptation around promoting reintegration in the global agenda against violent 
extremism.  
Moreover, the regional impacts of these results suggest the necessity for more direct 
communication and collaboration between Malaysia and Indonesia as the two states maintain 
different strengths and focus within their respective approaches. Improved regional 
communication between state-level actors and eventually nongovernmental organizations will 
resolve some of the deficits in Indonesia’s and Malaysia’s post-extremism programming by 
challenging them to reflect on existing shortcomings of their initiatives. For example, 
strengthening the relationship between the state and transnational community-based 
organizations would present the possibility of holding meaningful dialogues between historically 
tense groups like those of varying religions and between civilians and police. Other states in the 
regions can also use the structures and improvements of these programs as a catalyst to start their 
own. Additionally, looking beyond the state-level approach of one country can broaden the 
discussion to include a more robust analysis of nongovernmental actors and international groups 
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which are also contributing resources and expertise to the formulation of effective reintegration 
programming.  
There can also be an expansion of the discussion around colonial influences on the 
existing approaches to counterterrorism in other states. Indonesia represents a good model of 
development from the strict use of military repression of extremism that may assist other states’ 
progression towards employing more diverse tactics of reintegration. Similarly, Malaysia 
importantly demonstrates how their colonial experience more positively impacted their 
counterterrorism institutions following independence. Moreover, psychological, social, and 
economic factors that facilitate reintegration hold some universally applicable qualities and 
programs like those in Indonesia and Malaysia demonstrate attention to individuals. Thus, 
collaboration between countries on how to address these factors remain fruitful despite 
differences in culture, governmental structure, and civil society. States seeking their success with 
reintegration programming will be challenged to more holistically invest in long term solutions 
that empower individuals and the communities.    
 
Militarization and Reintegration   
While better regional collaboration and coordination offers hope for improvement in the 
area of reintegration, another recent development pushes in the opposite direction-- namely, the 
movement to militarize Southeast Asia’s regional approach to counterterrorism. The efficacy of 
this movement is contested and may detract from efforts to advance reintegration. Though 
Indonesia and Malaysia invested in their police-run reintegration programming, emphasis on the 
role of the military has not lagged. Generally, Southeast Asian countries have moved towards 
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militarization in direct response to terrorist activities in Southern Thailand and the Philippines 
(Tan, 2018). In this regard, a military response seems logical; however, militarization is a 
double-edged sword. As militarization can increase regional cooperation and security, it also 
promotes a hardline and violent approach to counterterrorism that threatens reintegration as 
states turn away from soft approaches. Military-dominated approaches also raise significant 
questions about how human rights will fare where the military takes the lead (Tan, 2018). Thus, 
the installation of more regional collaboration must come with specific focus and investment into 
primarily police-led reintegration as current efforts of regional counterterrorism are emboldening 
a more militarized counterterrorism approach.  
Furthermore, when military force is utilized individuals can lose trust in the state, a 
relationship that is crucial to the success of reintegration efforts. Militarization may be especially 
negative in Malaysia and Indonesia, as both states have a history of human rights abuses under 
the Internal Security Act and authoritarian rule, respectively (Human Rights Watch, 2014; Coca, 
2018). In the last several years, Indonesian President Joko Widodo called for stronger military 
intervention following a series of bombings in 2018 and the government shutdown of the 
Telegram application in 2016. The action created concerns surrounding the return of 
authoritarian rule and elevated role of the military in Indonesia as early on the army sought to 
seat itself as a guardian of the nation and nationalist cause (Coca, 2018; Rucktäschel & Schuck, 
2019).  
Correspondingly, in Malaysia new policies permit further police crackdown on suspected 
terrorists, those spreading ISIS ideology, and the financing of terrorist networks with hardline 
deterrent measures (Counter Extremism Project, 2019). Some fear these moves are consistent 
with possible power-grabbing by military forces, who historically struggle with police and 
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political groups for power across Southeast Asia (Tan, 2018). Thereby, if Indonesia and 
Malaysia, through further robust evaluation, prove consistently successful in addressing 
returning extremists with police-led reintegration, the approach should become a regional 
standard. Moreover, success for these regional leaders will likely negotiate a prominent role for 
police in counterterrorism efforts, especially in states with fraught relationships to military rule. 
Until a more definitive conclusion around the long-term efficacy of Indonesia and Malaysia’s 
model of police led reintegration can be drawn, regional collaboration must be approached with 
caution for the effects of militarization on reintegration. Overall, the discussion of regional 
implications and militarization demonstrates the tumultuous relationship between regional 
security, militarization, and reintegration. 
 
5.2 The Role of Media and Further Directions 
Furthermore, from the study of extremist reintegration in Indonesia and Malaysia it is 
important to also understand the impact of media on reintegration. Though outside the scope of 
this thesis, media influences on individuals attempting reintegration hold a variety of 
implications for programming both domestically and regionally. Moreover, engaging with 
counterterrorism through the media and specifically on social media are major focuses of both 
Indonesia and Malaysia. Malaysia, as highlighted in chapter 3, took steps in the third era of their 
reintegration history to set up the Counter Messaging Center to combat radical messages of Islam 
on social media (Hamidi, 2016). At the same time, The Malaysian Islamic Development 
Department set out to identify student leaders at universities to help spread the “true” definition 
of jihad and promote non-violence (Counter Extremism Project, 2019).  
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Malaysia also runs public awareness campaigns against violent, hateful, and radical posts 
on social media. In this effort the state is aided by civil service organizations that possess a 
similar long-term mission to counter radical narratives online and in communities around the 
state (Jani, 2017). Similarly, Indonesia also made positive use of the state’s media presence 
through collaboration with NU Online17 and other civil organizations that, like in Malaysia, 
promote a pluralistic and non-violent society (Counter Extremism Project, 2019). Indonesia also 
has a history of taking a more direct and hard approach to the spread of extremism on media 
platforms. In 2016, the Indonesian state banned Telegram, a messaging app, in Indonesia 
because it was believed to spread violent extremist speeches and helped extremists plan attacks 
(Counter Extremism Project, 2019).  
The government banning media platforms or individual accounts over extremist posts 
walks a thin line between counterterrorism and the maintenance of freedom of speech. In both 
the case of Malaysia’s and Indonesia’s response, the states confronted issues of extremism in the 
media by providing opposing and plural views to these posts. However, they both also engage 
with the hard approach of banning and shutting down accounts whether by a full application ban 
or state departments focused on extremist media (Hamidi, 2016; Counter Extremism Project, 
2019). As the internet has no borders, negative information being produced in one region of the 
world can seamlessly cause detrimental impacts on another. Moreover, the use of social media to 
silence beliefs opposite of the state raises concerns of a state-enforced ideological homogeneity 
that may also be a violation of human rights. This censorship could be interpreted as an attempt 
 
17 Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) Online, an open civil society organization that promotes a tolerant form of Islam to curb 
radicalization, extremism, and terrorism virtually. To date, NU online is the most trafficked Islamic website. (NU 
Online, 2019)  
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to produce correct or state-sanctioned definitions or interpretations of religion (Coca, 2018; 
Sumpter, 2019). As both Indonesia and Malaysia as well as countries like Denmark attempt to 
ideologically reform extremists, they are to some extent defining what is right and wrong beliefs 
within their borders.  
Specifically, media and social networking exposure are aspects of counterterrorism 
deserving of more discussion because of their ability to prevent radicalization and return to 
violent extremism. Strong bonds to family and friends prevent people from joining illegal 
activities on the internet according to social bond theory, and many who re-offend are found to 
maintain no significant outside social network (Berghuis 2018; Hwang, 2018). If social needs are 
not addressed, a former extremist or vulnerable individual met with social isolation and rejection 
can turn to routes of the only social support they feel are welcoming and meaningful – a virtual 
terrorist organization (Hwang, 2018). Transnational terrorist organizations are increasingly 
present virtually and accessible at all times. Thus, a relapse into this network or indoctrination by 
fake and hateful media is possible with poor enforcement or resourcing of programs that teach 
digital literacy or directly regulate media platforms.  
Furthermore, important future research directions align my findings and this discussion 
on media with the plight of migrant workers in Southeast Asia. For example, as the role of media 
can broadly be considered a preventative measure to the radicalization of individuals in a society, 
working to curb issues facing migrant workers abroad that prompt their radicalization can also be 
preventative (Nuraniyah, 2017). Migrant workers also report using social media to find 
community and religious support while abroad and are subject to various forms of foreign media 
that can impact their ability to reintegrate into their domestic society should they be repatriated 
due to extremist behavior (Mansour-Ille, 2019). However, in both cases, when considering 
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reintegration, media and issues facing migrant workers are relevant because teaching digital 
literacy as well as providing financial support and social inclusion to migrant workers will 
strengthen individuals on the path to reintegration against re-radicalization. 
Overall, our increasingly digital world will continue to breed concerns about online social 
connections. Therefore, social media in particular must be addressed in reintegration 
programming with similar consideration as for interpersonal social factors discussed in chapter 2. 
How individuals must reconstruct their virtual presence and identity on social media following 
their disaffiliation with terrorist organizations and attempted reintegration requires precise focus. 
Understanding this discussion also relates to the concept that many factors that facilitate 
successful reintegration can also be initiated in preventative protections against radicalization. 
This overlap exists because the process of radicalization and reintegration share similar features 
as they are both reconstructions of an inner self and social awareness. This study of reintegration 
in Indonesia and Malaysia denotes a complex relationship between online extremism, state 
intervention, and reintegration. This relationship underscores the need to dedicate further study 
to these digital networks, particularly as stakeholders consider taking a more transnational 
approach to reintegrating former extremists. 
 
5.3 Summary of Regional Impacts and The Role of Media 
In brief, modern terrorism is not bound by a single border so neither must the approaches 
to address its root causes and reintegrate former extremists. The regional implications of 
evaluating state reintegration programs like in Indonesia and Malaysia can produce a healthy 
wave of collaboration and sharing between states to start and maintain effective reintegration 
programs. Opening these channels and relationships around counterterrorism can facilitate the 
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international system’s ability to check human rights abuses in different programs and resource 
across borders when needed. However, it must be considered that this collaboration can also 
cause mixed consequences as movements to militarize counterterrorism can also spread if some 
states or regions see successes from military response to terrorism.  
The militarization that may be correlated with transnational collaboration around 
counterterrorism requires attention because military might could in turn continue to feed the 
cycle of terrorism. Where hardline tactics of deterrence and force may expand the population that 
is enrolled in reintegration programming, violence and disconnect between civilians and military 
personnel can cause programming to be less effective in catalyzing actual psychological or 
cognitive change. Similarly, military power over counterterrorism can bleed into military 
monopolization of other state departments and programs that could result in an uneven role and 
power taken by the military in some states.  
Moreover, media also serves as a delicate balancing point in the battle against extremism. 
On one hand, freedom of speech and expression are universal human rights, fundamentally in the 
practice of providing a check to governments and advocating for others. Conversely, the practice 
of this right also plays a role in the planning and execution of violence. Indonesia and Malaysia 
have both been oppressive in some regard during their fight against extremist messaging. 
Nevertheless, both states also took steps to combat the spread of extremism on social media with 
positive and pluralist posts. Stepping on human rights is a risky decision that may drive some 
individuals to join extremist causes against the state. Thus, Indonesia and Malaysia’s efforts to 
counter radical propaganda with reinforcing messages of religion and peace is a promising 
approach that falls in line with their reintegration efforts and requires further investigation. 
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Conclusion  
This thesis established that Indonesia and Malaysia own important histories of achieving 
some effective reintegration strategies yet fail to possess successful reintegration programs that 
address all major factors underlying the process. The evaluation of these state programs also 
warranted an exploration into reintegration as a distinct concept from disengagement, 
deradicalization, and rehabilitation. A reintegration centered approach was proven the more 
effective strategy to peacefully integrate extremists back into society against state programs 
focusing only on the deradicalization of extremist individuals. From these conclusions, a clearer 
path forward is indicated for the reintegration of extremists into Indonesian and Malaysian 
societies. This path will push states seeking similar success to focus on the individual and the 
distinct identities held by those susceptible to radicalization and extremism in their societies. At 
the state level, this focus can promote the formulation and enforcement of policy that serves 
vulnerable populations as well as provide vital support to community-based organizations 
already working to protect and serve these groups. In particular, the path towards improvement 
and reintegration delineated in this thesis illuminates the value of shifting the global response to 
terrorism from military might to community and individual empowering solutions that invest in 
longevity. A “dangerous assumption that must be dismissed”, one expert recognizes, “is that 
terrorists are somehow no longer ‘relevant’ once their involvement in terrorism has ceased” 
(Silke, 2003). Undeniably, those who return possess immense potential.  
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Appendix A: Abridged Timeline of Counterterrorism and Policy in Indonesia and 
Malaysia  
Indonesia 
 Era 1: Suharto’s Rule to Resignation (1998) 
 
1800’s 
 
Padri Rebellion takes place by Muslim clerics attempting to enforce Sharia law. 
 
1980’s 
 
Young Indonesians travel to Pakistan, a base for Afghan jihad against Soviet occupation, and 
around 200 train with Afghan Mujahidin. 
 
Abu Bakar Bashir and Abdullah Sungkar found JI by leveraging their al-Qaeda connections.  
 
1982 
 
Suharto’s New Order government forces Islamic organizations to adopt the philosophy of 
Pancasila as the sole ideological basis. 
 
1990’s 
 
Sungkar relocates his operation to the southern Philippines under pressure from Pakistani 
authorities. 
 
1998 
 
JI splinters after Osama Bin Laden’s fatwa. 
 
After Suharto’s fall, Indonesian Muslims who traveled to fight the Soviet Union in Afghanistan 
returned to Indonesia and formed various militant groups. 
 
 
Era 2: Suharto’s Resignation (1998) to First Bali Bombings (2002) 
 
1999 
 
Conflict erupts in Maluku islands amid Suharto’s demise. Eventually fighting spreads west to 
Sulawesi. 
 
2000 
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Some JI members train in southern Philippines and marry local women, establishing roots in 
multiple Southeast Asian countries. 
 
December 
First major JI attack occurs in Indonesia. The assailants bomb 28 churches in Jakarta, throughout 
Sumatra, and Java. 120 people are injured and 19 die. JI leader Hambali is suspected as 
coordinator of attack.  
 
2000’s 
 
Indonesia begins “hard” measures against terrorism. 
 
JI begins a period of relative inactivity after a crackdown by the Indonesian government. 
 
Era 3: Bali Bombings (2002) to Establishment of the BNPT (2010) 
 
2002 
 
Previously JI was led by individuals trained in Afghanistan linked to Al Qaeda and anti-Western 
ideology. Now, JI’s ranks become depleted due to internal struggles, imprisonment, and death.  
 
October 
JI-affiliated terrorists set off bombs at two crowded nightclubs on the resort island of Bali, Sari 
Club and Paddy’s. 
 
After the Bali bombings by JI, creating a strategy to deal with terrorism became one of 
Indonesia’s most urgent national security priorities. 
 
President Megawati Soekamoputri issues The Interim Law, to supplement existing criminal law 
and give the government the ability to efficiently investigate, prosecute, and convict terrorists. 
 
Between 2002 and 2015, Indonesia prosecuted more than 700 suspected terrorists. 
 
Since the Bali Bombing, over 650 people were released after serving sentences for terrorism-
related offenses. 
 
2003 
 
June 
The special police anti-terror unit, Densus 88, is established in the wake of the Bali attacks in 
2002. In 2005, Densus 88 becomes largely responsible for pursuing terror suspects. 
 
August  
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A car bomb outside of the JW Marriott Hotel in Jakarta kills 12 and wounds 150. Police believe 
the attack is similar to the Bali bombings and the attack is attributed to JI. 
 
2004 
 
September 
 
A car bomb is detonated by Islamic extremists outside the Australian embassy in Jakarta ahead 
of elections in both Indonesia and Australia. At least 10 people lose their lives and more than 100 
are wounded. JI suspected to be behind the attack. 
 
Constitutional Court rules prosecution of a man charged with playing a role in the Bali bombings 
was unconstitutional under revised legislation because his case does not meet the extraordinary 
nature of the perpetrator’s crimes. 
 
2005 
 
October  
Authorities believe JI senior leaders Azahari Husin and Noordin Top planned a suicide bombing 
by three individuals at two sites on Bali resort island. Targets were the Four Seasons hotel and a 
shopping square popular to tourists, 20 die and more than 100 are injured.  
 
2006 
 
Indonesia’s commitment to interdepartmental cooperation allows police officers and prosecutors 
to work together to successfully prosecute terrorism cases. Indonesia prosecutes Umar Patek, a 
Bali bombing suspect extradited from Pakistan. 
 
2009 
 
July  
JW Marriott Hotel and Ritz Carlton in Jakarta business district attacked by JI suicide bombers 
killing 8 people and wounding 50. Attacks inspire physical hardening of potential targets, 
involving regulation and surveillance of traffic and increased security outside buildings and 
prominent sites. 
 
2010 
 
Police raid Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid training camp in Aceh, weakening the organization as well 
as some JI splinter groups. Prosecution and conviction of JI founder Abu Bakar Ba’asyir and 
others occurs.  
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After the hotel bombings BNPT, the national agency for combating terrorism is established, 
marking the first-time police, military, and intelligence agencies join forces to create a more 
cohesive counterterrorism strategy. 
 
Era 3: Establishment of BNPT (2010) to Use of Online Platforms in Counterterrorism (~2016) 
 
2010 
 
Addendum to 2003 law was passed, establishing the BNPT, which oversees the coordination for 
all anti-terrorism units in Indonesia, including Detachment 88, the National Intelligence Agency, 
the military’s anti-terrorism units, and the Anti-Terrorism Desk.  
 
2012 
 
Indonesia ratifies ASEAN Convention on Counterterrorism, mandating cooperation on terrorism 
prevention, law enforcement, information sharing, and terrorist rehabilitation. 
 
2013 
 
Deradicalisation Blueprint from BNPT stresses the importance of facilitating former extremists’ 
return to their communities. 
 
2014 
 
September 
Indonesia co-sponsored U.N. Security Council Resolution 2178, which seeks to prevent 
radicalization and restrict the movement of foreign fighters.  
 
Southeast Asia’s jihadi movement is energized and divided by the rise of ISIS. Inmates fight in 
prisons over allegiance to different groups. 
 
2015 
 
September 
Indonesian Vice President Jusul Kalla stresses on social welfare improvement and rehabilitation 
as a strategy to fight extremism at Obama’s Summit on Countering ISIL and Violent Extremism. 
 
November 
In November 2015, the National Counterterrorism Agency requested that the Indonesian 
Communications and Informatics Ministry block a propaganda video featuring Santoso’s voice 
communicating messages of jihad. 
 
 
Era 4: Use of Online Platforms (~2016) to Now (Dec. 2019) 
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2016 
 
Purwakarta Ideology School is formed by Mulyadi in efforts to promote civic education, social 
justice, and unity. 
 
Operation Tinombala, a joint army-police operation to eliminate the Mujahidin Indonesia Timur 
terroirs group, launched in Poso, Central Sulawesi. This is an example of increased involvement 
of the military in counterterrorism. 
 
Concerns of the border patrol’s manpower arise from a DPR member since the country has only 
7,000 immigration officers which is less than Malaysia and Singapore.  
 
C-SAVE organization is created to build a national network of civil society organizations to fight 
radicalism, prevent violence, and promote peace. 
 
January 
14: 5 ISIS-affiliated terrorists attack a shopping and business district in Jakarta, resulting in 4 
deaths and 25 wounded. A Starbucks and a police post are targeted with multiple explosions.  
 
Websites with Jihadist material blocked by the Indonesian government after the January attacks. 
Social media and messaging platforms asked by the Indonesian government to remove extremist 
content. Encrypted messaging service Telegram is blocked by the Indonesia’s Ministry of 
Communication, claiming it had been used to promote radicalism and instructions for attacks. 
 
February 
New measures to combat extremism in prisons announced by the Indonesian government. 
 
July  
5: 30-year-old Nur Rohman, who has connections to Bahrun Naim a known extremist, commits a 
suicide bombing on a motorcycle in front of a Java police station, killing a policeman and 
injuring another.  
 
23: Police confirm death of Indonesia’s most-wanted pro-ISIS jihadist fugitive, Abu Wardah 
(aka Santoso). 
 
August 
Police uncover a plot to launch a rocket attack on Singapore from Batam claiming that Naim 
provided funds and instructions to the foiled attackers. 
 
Indonesia spearheads the Counter-Terrorism Financing Summit to fight terrorism financing. 
 
Joint naval patrols agreed to by Indonesian, Malaysian, and Singaporean defense ministers. 
 
November  
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13: A group of children outside a church on the Island of Borneo are targeted by an attacker 
throwing petrol bombs which kills a 2-year-old girl and injures 3 children. Police arrest a 32-
year-old former terror convict and four others suspecting connections to ISIS. 
 
December  
According to the U.S. Department of State, 241 terrorists are imprisoned in Indonesia with 150 
suspects held in detention facilities awaiting trial.  
 
10: Three suspects in Jakarta arrested by police who confiscate a pressure-cooker bomb. The 
suspects planned to use a female suicide bomber to bomb the presidential palace. The group had 
connections to Syria-based Indonesian extremist Barun Naim.  
 
21: Three suspected ISIS members are killed in a Jakarta raid after throwing a bomb at them. 
Another bomb is defused, and suspect arrested before the raid. 
Police raid a Jakarta neighborhood and kill three suspected ISIS members after one of the 
suspects throws a bomb at them. Police cordon off the neighborhood and diffuse another bomb.  
 
2017 
 
Over 220 Indonesians deported from Turkey after failing to enter Syria. 
 
Over 200 Indonesians forcibly repatriated and sent back to their communities after one month of 
state rehabilitation. 
 
President Joko Widodo publicly argues for greater military involvement in counterterrorism 
leading to more intense calls for reduced military involvement. 
 
A female deportee from Hong Kong, Anggi, arrested while prepping explosives for an attack. 
 
Hizb-ut Tahrir banned by the Indonesian government for representing a potential threat to 
societal unity. Many become concerned about a return of authoritarian rule to a country that 
promotes freedoms of speech and assembly.  
 
January  
7: JAD, a network formed in 2015 when Indonesian extremist groups together pledged 
allegiance to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, an ISIS leader, is designated as Specially Designated 
Global Terrorist by US Department of State. 
 
February 
27: A government building in West Java catches fire when a suspected terrorist blows up a 
pressure cooker bomb. The bomber is shot and captured by the Indonesian police, who was being 
monitored by the anti-terror squad for extremist links.  
 
May 
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 8: President Joko Widodo communicates plans to ban HT and dissolve the group’s charter after 
evaluation by a government panel.  
 
24: Police officers guarding a parade route targeted by 2 suicide bombers detonating explosives 
at a Jakarta bus terminal, killing 3 officers and wounding 12 others including civilians. One of 
the suspects is connected to ISIS after a raid on his home. 
 
June 
25: Police officer is stabbed and killed by 2 attackers with ISIS connections in Medan hours 
before the end of Ramadan. One attacker is killed and the other injured by police who discover 
ISIS propaganda in the attacker’s home. 
 
A new law allowing imprisonment of returning FTFs for up to 15 years is announced. The law 
permits detention of terrorist suspects without trial and includes hate speech, paramilitary 
training, and membership to banned extremist groups as terrorism activities. 
 
July  
Indonesia and Malaysia agree to better military cooperation in counterterrorism efforts. 
 
Reportedly 2,691 individuals with connections to terror groups are under government 
surveillance. 
 
The rising threat of foreign terrorist fighters is addressed in a meeting co-hosted by Indonesia 
and Australia with Malaysia, the Philippines, and New Zealand. 
 
19: HT petitions its dissolution after the Indonesian government revokes its legal status and 
disbands the organization. Jakarta State Administrative Court rejects the petition.  
 
August 
15: 5 alleged ISIS supporters arrested in Bandung for allegedly attempting to create chemical 
bombs to attack the presidential palace.  
 
September 
Approximately 84 Indonesians have returned independently from Middle East conflict zones. 
 
2018 
 
There is no allocated budget for reintegration of deportees and money must be obtained from 
various other areas of government funds . 
 
New laws allow prosecution of Indonesians who joined ISIS abroad and returned to Indonesia as 
they are considered members of a foreign terrorist organization. Sentences for those involved in 
any training, foreign conflicts, or terrorist attacks range from 4-1 years with a potential for 
revocation of passport rights. 
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Estimates from Indonesia suggest 800 fighters traveled from Indonesia to Syria and Iraq since 
2012.  
 
March 
A memorandum of understanding on counterterrorism and deradicalization cooperation is signed 
by the Home Affairs Minister and the BNPT head. 
 
May 
The Indonesian military is granted a stronger role in counterterrorism following a string of 
bombings by Islamic extremists in Surabaya. Also, passing of the counterterrorism bill grants 
police greater power to preempt attacks for example by preventive detention of suspects. 
 
500 Indonesians claimed to be fighting in Syria and Iraq while 500 had returned and 103 died in 
conflict, according to Indonesian Police Chief Tito Karnavian. 
 
8: A prisoner-staged riot occurs at a high-security detention center at the Mobile Brigade Corps 
headquarters which is Indonesia’s special police unit. In the deadliest incident five police officers 
are killed. Being the second riot since November 2017, analysts claim the center is not prepared 
to hold such a large number of high-risk prisoners. All surviving inmates are transported to be 
held at Indonesia’s maximum-security island of Nusakambangan.  
 
13: Three churches are bombed in Surabaya, East Java by a family of six. The father bombs one 
while 2 teenage sons the second and a mother and 2 daughters the third, killing 12. This attack is 
the first attack by a female suicide bomber in Indonesia. 
Hours after the church attack, a mother and her teenage son die in Sidoarjo, East Java when the 
bomb their father was making prematurely explodes. The father is killed by police officers. 
 
14: Ten people are injured when a family of 5 launch a suicide bombing against a police station 
in Surabaya. Only the 8-year-old daughter survives. ISIS claims responsibility.  
  
June 
More pathways to prosecution of terrorism are created by updated legislation which includes 
membership of a proscribed terrorist organization. 
 
It is estimated that over 120 Indonesian terrorists lost their lives fighting in Iraq and Syria since 
2014. It is also estimated that 500 remain fighting in those areas including 200 women and 
children of ISIS living at the al-Hawl refugee camp at the border of Syria and Turkey. 
 
22: Influential ISIS supporter and U.S.-designated terrorist Aman Abdurrahman is found guilty 
of terrorism for charges related to the January 2016 ISIS terrorist attack in Jakarta, he receives 
the death penalty. 
 
July 
The government claims only 86 Indonesians who fought in Syria returned home while 539 who 
traveled to Syria were deported by Turkey. 
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31: JAD is outlawed by a Jakarta court for allegedly being a terrorist organization with ties to 
ISIS. According to the Wall Street Journal, JAD is believed to have 1,000 members in Indonesia 
with several hundred in detention. 
 
November 
Indonesian Intelligence Agency announces it conducted a 4-month investigation of about 1,000 
mosques. 
 
2019 
 
February 
U.S. and U.N. designated Indonesian militant Mohammed Karim Yusop Faiz declared dead by 
Syrian police.  
 
March 
18: JAD leader Abu Umar (aka Syamsul Afirin) sentenced to 10 years imprisonment for 
involvement in 2018 Surabaya bombings. 
 
June  
An Indonesian woman was sentenced to 15 years imprisonment for ISIS membership. 
 
29: Leader of Islamist group JI, Para Wijayanto, was arrested at a hotel outside of Jakarta. 
  
Current 
The BNPT attempts to use soft approaches to counter extremist in Indonesian society and to 
deradicalize convicted terrorists within prisons. The Wahid Foundation works to implement 
deradicalization programs in partnership with BNPT. Despite recent reforms focused on hard 
short-term actions to counterterrorism, President Widodo agrees to support new policies aimed at 
preventing radicalization of youth. 
 
 
Malaysia 
 
Era 1: From Emergency to 9/11 
1930’s 
While a part of the British colonies, Malaysia begins facing domestic communist insurgency. 
 
1960 
The Internal Security Act passes allowing executive action against radicalism. The act played a 
large role in combating extremism and terrorism until repeal in September 2011. 
 
1963 
The independent state of Malaysia established. 
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Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft (Tokyo 
Convention) occurs. 
 
1963-1966  
Malaysia faces external threats from conflict of the Indonesian Confrontation. The dispute is 
resolved. 
 
1969 
Interregnum- tremendous violence among ethnic and class lines. 
 
1970  
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (Hague Convention). 
 
1971  
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation  
(Montreal Convention). 
 
1973  
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crime against Internationally Protected 
Persons, including Diplomatic Agents. 
 
1979  
International Convention against the Taking of Hostages. 
 
1970’s  
Religion becomes a means to spread mistrust and undermine the elected government. 
Malaysia identifies the threat of Islamic extremists and adopts a policy to address it. The policy 
includes a deradicalization program for those detained under the ISA.  
 
Violent activities intensified against CPM during the 1970s and 1980s. 
 
1980’s 
Militants from Malaysia join the fight in Afghanistan against Soviet occupation. Fighters 
eventually return home. 
 
1985  
The Memali Incident, an armed conflict between police and fringe Islamic radicalists leads to 
18 deaths. 
 
1988  
Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International 
Civil Aviation, a supplement to Montreal Convention. 
 
1989 
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Peace treaty between CPM and the Malaysian government signed. 
 
1991  
Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection. 
 
1997  
International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings.  
 
1999  
Malaysia joins global move to combat terrorist financing by agreeing to UN International 
Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism.  
 
Late 1990’s 
Domestic Islamic extremist groups: Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia (KMM) made up of 
Malaysian fighters from Soviet-Afghanistan war, and regional groups like Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) 
and Moro Islamic Liberation Front and Abu Sayyaf Group threaten Malaysian society. 
 
2000 
January 
Several al-Qaeda operatives, including perpetrators of the September 11, 2001, attacks gather in 
Kuala Lumpur for training. 
 
 
Era 2: 9/11 to the repeal of the Internal Security Act 
 
2001 
KMM and JI revolutionary cells uncovered with alleged links to Al Qaeda. After 9/11 attacks, 
the Malaysian government cracks down on KMM and JI. 
 
Anti-Money Laundering and Anti-Terrorism Financing Act 2001 (AMLATFA) requires 
institutions to submit suspicious transactions to the financial intelligence unit of Central Bank of 
Malaysia. 
 
2003 
 
July  
Malaysian Ministry of Foreign Affairs founds the Southeast Asia Regional Centre for Counter-
Terrorism.  
 
Era 3: Movement of Malaysians to join foreign jihad and The institution of POCA and 
SOSMA to replace ISA to the start of a focus on deradicalization (2015) 
 
2012 
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Internal Security Act Repealed. 
 
Malaysian extremists start traveling to Syria to fight with Al-Qaeda. Many eventually join ISIS. 
 
Malaysian government enacts the Security Offences (Special Measures) Act (SOSMA), 
providing procedures for arrest of serious offenses including terrorism and exciting disaffection 
against the Supreme Ruler. Under the Penal Code terrorism or assisting terrorists carries 
imprisonment of up to 30 years, life sentences, or death. 
 
2013 
 
February-March 
Standoff and defeat of Sulu militants resulting in the death of 56 militants, 6 civilians, and 10 
security forces members. 
 
The new challenge since 2013 arises from the Islamic State (IS) militancy or Daesh that has 
become the fastest-growing threat to Malaysia. 
 
2014 
 
April 
Enforcement of the Prevention of Crime (Amendment and Extension) Act (POCA) commenced 
to expand its application to all the states in Malaysia and to include terrorism offenses. 
 
August 
Three Malaysian women are believed to have traveled to Syria to offer themselves as comfort 
women to ISIS according to Malaysian Intelligence. 
 
Malaysia implements U.N. Security Council Resolutions 2170 and 2178.  
 
September 
Global Coalition declares that it is committed to defeating ISIS. 
 
2015 
 
February 
2 Malaysians, Mohd Faris Anuar and Muhammad Wanndy Mohamed Jedi, are involved in an 
ISIS beheading video.  
 
April  
Malaysian Defense Minister tells parliament that as many as 70 Malaysian military personnel 
found to have “joined” ISIS. 
 
May 
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Home Affairs Minister Ahmad Zahid Hamidi emphasizes that Malaysia sees rehabilitation and 
deradicalization as integral to combating terrorism. 
 
Era 4: Further Policy and Legal additions- now POTA and SMATA to Present 
 
2015 
 
Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA) and Special Measures against Terrorism in Foreign 
Countries Act (SMATA) are enacted. 
 
Malaysia created an integrated rehabilitation module for those detained under POTA. 
 
October  
U.S. selects Malaysia to host the regional center to counteract online ISIS propaganda. Malaysia 
joins the U.S.-led Global Coalition to fight ISIS. 
 
2016 
 
Malaysia joins Financial Action Task Force, whose goal is to combat money laundering, 
terrorism financing, and threats to the international financial system. 
 
January  
Malaysian, Indonesian, and Filipino ISIS fighters in Syria make a video calling for lone-wolf 
attacks in the 3 countries. 
 
Prime minister orders police to heighten security after deadly ISIS attack in Indonesia and arrest 
of a suspected suicide bomber in Kuala Lumpur. 
 
A 16-year-old boy attempts ISIS-influenced solo kidnapping at a shopping mall. 
 
Special ASEAN meeting led by Malaysia in response to recent terror attacks in Southeast Asia, 
namely Jakarta, and Bangkok. 17 ministers or heads of delegation shared policy statements on 
deradicalization. Australia, Brunei, Cambodia, France, Italy, Indonesia, Japan, Laos, Malaysia, 
Myanmar, the People's Republic of China, Singapore, Thailand, United Arab Emirates, United 
Kingdom, United States of America and Vietnam were all represented. 
 
April 
EU and Malaysia enter into PCA to increase political dialogue and cooperation on issues 
including counterterrorism. 
 
June  
Grenade attack occurs on a nightclub near Kuala Lumpur. 
 
July  
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15 ISIS-linked individuals arrested including 2 low ranking policemen according to Malaysian 
Inspector General. 
 
August  
In New York Malaysia emphasizes deradicalization and rehabilitation as proven methods to 
change mindsets of radical individuals to reintegrate them and prevent recidivism. Malaysia 
emphasizes that terrorism cannot only be defeated with force. 
 
Malaysian police warn that ISIS is getting more aggressive in distributing propaganda.  
 
Indonesia and Malaysia agree to share biometric data of suspected and convicted terrorists as 
well as best practices of deradicalization and counter extremism. 
 
NSCA grants sweeping powers to the new National Security Council.  
 
October  
National Special Operations Force, Malaysia’s first multi-agency counterterrorism force is 
launched. 
 
November  
25-year-old Malaysian national Hasan Zakaria drives car bomb into Kurdish soldiers in Syria 
killing 15 and injuring many. 
 
Prime minister Najib Razak meets Philippines President Rodrigo Duterte to discuss operations 
against ASG, a Philippines-based terrorist group. 
 
2017 
 
January  
3 Malaysian ISIS militants reportedly killed in an airstrike in Syria. 
 
March 
Malaysia has met with Indonesia and the Philippines to address regional security concerns. 
Beginning in 2016, the three governments met several times to discuss maritime cooperation, 
culminating in a March 2017 agreement to launch joint patrols of the Sulu Sea to safeguard 
ships’ crew from piracy and kidnapping. 
 
Malaysian government cracks down on persons suspected of promoting ISIS ideology and 
recruiting new members. 
 
Deputy Prime Minister and Home Affairs Minister Ahmad Zahid Hamidi meet with New 
Zealand Attorney-General Christopher Finlayson. 
 
Ministry of Home Affairs announces that the government seeks to strictly enforce existing 
criminal laws to prosecute those suspected of terrorism. 
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April 
Malaysia’s Deputy Home Minister Nur Jazlan Mohamed and visiting U.K. minister discuss 
closer cooperation on counterterrorism and counter-extremism. 
 
2018 
 
No ISIS-affiliated attacks in Malaysia according to the U.S. Department of State. 
 
May 
The first transition of power since independence, new government pledges to review legislation 
governing arrest, investigation, and detention of terrorist suspects. 
 
July 
Malaysia gives a conditional return offer to approximately 102 Malaysians who left the country 
to join ISIS. 
 
November  
Malaysian authorities release Yazid Sufaat from the Simpang Renggam penitentiary sent him to 
his home.  
 
Sources: Counter Extremism Project, 2019; Hamidi, 2016; Rucktäschel & Schuck, 2019; 
Sumpter 2019  
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